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The Federal Reserve System has come to occupy center stage in the
formulation and implementation of national and global economic policy. And
yet, the mechanisms through which the Fed creates that policy are rarely
analyzed. Scholars, central bankers, and other policymakers assume that the
Fed's independent authority to make policy is created by law-specifically, the
Federal Reserve Act, which created removability protectionfor actors within the
Fed, long tenures for Fed Governors, and budgetary autonomy from Congress.
This Article analyzes these assumptions about law and argues that nothing
about Fed independence is as it seems. Removability protection does not exist
for the Fed Chair, but it exists in unconstitutional form for the Reserve Bank
presidents. Governors never serve their full fourteen-year terms, giving every
President since FDR twice the appointments that the Federal Reserve Act
anticipated. And the budgetary independence designed in 1913 bears little
relation to the budgetary independence of2015. This Article thus challenges the
prevailing accounts of agency independence in administrative law and central
bank independence literature, both of which focus on law as the basis of Fed
independence. It argues, instead, that the life of the Act-how its terms are
interpreted, how its legal and economic contexts change, and how politics and
individual personalities influence policymaking-is more important to
understanding Fed independence than the birth of the Act, the language passed
by Congress. The institutions of Federal Reserve independence include statute,
but not only the statute. Law, conventions, politics, and personalities all shape
the Fed's unique policy-making space in ways that scholars, central bankers,
and policy-makers have ignored.
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Introduction
On December 23, 2013, the Federal Reserve System celebrated its
centennial. Over the course of that century, the Fed' has become one of the most
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important governmental agencies in the history of the American republic, a
transformation one scholar has labeled "the most remarkable bureaucratic
metamorphosis in American history."2 Its policies influence nearly every aspect
of public and private life. Given this importance and influence, "[n]o one can
afford to ignore the Fed."3
At the core of that "remarkable bureaucratic metamorphosis" is a much-
invoked but as often misunderstood set of institutional arrangements that
constitute the Fed's unique independence. In the standard popular and academic
account, law is at the center of that independence. Indeed, it is the Federal
Reserve Act4 itself that defines the Fed's independence. Economists and political
scientists interested in central bank independence-interested enough to give the
concept its own acronym (CBI)'- take largely as given that law defines central
bank independence.6 And legal academics, in the exceptional event hat they
have taken note of the Fed,7 have analyzed its independence within the context
of administrative law8 under the framework developed to assess "agency
primarily, my exceptional colleagues at the Stanford Law School Library (especially Rachael Samberg,
Sergio Stone, Erika Wayne, and George Wilson) for their expertise and resourcefulness. I note unusual
primary source contributions in the footnotes below.
1. The Article refers to the Federal Reserve Board only in reference to the pre-1935
entity, the Board of Governors for its post-1935 incarnation, and Reserve Banks throughout. The
shorthand "Fed" and "Federal Reserve" refer to the entire System, the Board of Governors, or the Federal
Open Markets Committee (FOMC), as will be clear from the context. Absent clarification, "the Fed" refers
to the entire System.
2. DONALD KETTL, LEADERSHIP AT THE FED 9 (1988).
3. STEVEN K. BECKNER, BACK FROM THE BRINK: THE GREENSPAN YEARS xi (1997).
4. 12 U.S.C. ch. 3 (2012)
5. ALAN BLINDER, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: CENTRAL BANKING GOES MODERN 1
(2004) (describing the explosion of research in CBI).
6. See infra Part 1.
7. There are important exceptions. The most thorough is the work of European legal
scholar Rosa Lastra, who focuses on central banking generally. See ROSA MARIA LASTRA, THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY 41-72 (2006) [hereinafter, LASTRA, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS]; ROSA MARIA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION 10-70 (1996)
[hereinafter LASTRA, BANKING REGULATION]; see also Rosa M. Lastra & Geoffrey P. Miller, Central
Bank Independence in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: THE
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
31-50 (Jan Kleiman ed., 2001) (discussing the balance between central bank independence and democratic
accountability). For a recent exception, see Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (2012); and Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve's Use of International Swap
Lines, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 603 (2013). Robert Hockett and Saule T. Omarova work on a broader project in
the role of government as market actors, which includes engagement with the Federal Reserve System.
See Robert Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private" Means to "Public" Ends: Governments as Market
Actors, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract-2222444. Timothy Canova
has also sustained a critique of the Fed generally and central bank independence specifically. See, e.g.,
Timothy A. Canova, Central Bank Independence as Agency Capture: A Review of the Empirical
Literature, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 11 (2011); Timothy A. Canova, Black Swans and
Black Elephants in Plain Sight: An Empirical Review of Central Bank Independence, 14 CHAP. L. REV.
237 (2011). For an excellent, though by now dated, overview of the Federal Open Market Committee, see
Mark Bernstein, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with
Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (describing mechanisms of Fed independence within the
context of agency independence generally); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions ofAgency Independence, 113
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independence" generally.9 Unsurprisingly, statutes are at the center of that
analysis, too.
This Article argues that the idea that Fed independence is determined solely
by the Federal Reserve Act is wrong for two reasons.10 First, in some cases, the
statute does not say what economics, political scientists, and legal academics
have assumed it says. The Federal Reserve Act is invoked but not read. Second
and more often, the statute has created a system that subsequent practices have
changed, strengthened, or undermined so completely as to render the original
statutory system misleading or worse. The law as written has become displaced
by the law as implemented. The result is that reading the Federal Reserve Act in
isolation tells us very little about the way this unique government agency
exercises its extraordinary power.
To make this argument, the Article draws on the language, structure, and
history of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (especially as amended in 1935),"
other legislative materials, memoirs and biographies of Fed Chairs and other
insiders, and other archival resources. The result-part of a broader projectl-
is a more comprehensive account of the legal context of Fed independence and
its evolution than scholars have yet been able to give.
The Article's contributions are primarily descriptive. The effort is to
provide a more grounded understanding of how the law does and does not
determine the Fed's distinct policymaking space. The Article explains the
context and historical change of the many mechanisms of Fed independence,
providing for the first time an explanation of how the Fed's funding,
appointments, and removability protections have evolved since they were first
installed by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the Banking Act of 1935, which
refounded the Fed.
Understanding the Article's contributions requires knowing more about the
System's circuitous governance structure. The System consists of two
committees: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, composed
of seven presidential appointments, requiring Senate confirmation, who serve
COLUM. L. REv. 1163 (2013) (discussing conventions of Fed independence within the context of agency
independence generally).
9. For an early example by a prominent author, see William Howard Taft, Boundaries
Between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L. J. 599,
608 (1916), which states, "Whether the President has the absolute power of removal without the consent
of the Senate in respect to all offices, the tenure of which is not affected by the Constitution, is not
definitely settled." Several recent articles provide excellent overviews of the literature. See Barkow, supra
note 8, at 16-18; Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future ofAgency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 631-37 (2010); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1,
23-31 (2013).
10. The standard account is more robust than this: it looks, too, at the legal relationship
between the President and the Fed Chair for purposes of monetary policy. The book from which this
Article is drawn challenges as incorrect all four of those bases: law, the President, the Fed Chair, and
monetary policy. See PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
(forthcoming 2015).
11. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, enacted June 16, 1933.




fourteen-year terms. One of these "Governors" is designated the Fed Chair, a
separate presidential appointment that also requires Senate confirmation, who
serves renewable four-year terms. The second committee is the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC), composed of all seven Governors plus the twelve
presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks. Of those twelve Reserve Bank
presidents, five carry a vote on the FOMC at any given time: the president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and four others on a rotating basis. The Fed
Chair is also the Chair of the FOMC; the Vice Chair of the FOMC is the president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These Reserve Bank presidents are
appointed by a board of directors themselves appointed by private banks and the
Board of Governors. The Article elaborates on this process in more detail below.
The Article discusses three aspects of this multi-layered governance
structure often described as the core of the Fed's independence. First, it explains
that the Fed's extraordinary budgetary autonomy-its ability to create the money
with which it funds itself-is not authorized by statute, but arose out of changes
to the way that monetary policy was conducted over the course of the Fed's
century. Second, the Article explains that the fourteen-year non-renewable term
of the Fed Governors (meant to enhance Fed independence) and the four-year
renewable term for the Fed Chair (meant o enhance accountability) have become
precisely the opposite: filling Governor vacancies has made the Fed more
dependent on the President, filling Chair vacancies has made it less. And third,
the Article argues that removability protections ironically do not exist for the Fed
Chair, but do exist in unconstitutional and probably non-justiciable form for the
presidents of the Reserve Banks. This absence of protection for the Fed Chair is
true despite the fact that, in administrative law, agency independence is usually
equivalent with removability protection for the agency head. In this respect, the
Fed's "independence," then, is as much a function of politics as it is of law.
This more nuanced approach to the role of law in insulating the Fed from
politics gives insight into the roles that law and history play in creating the
boundaries of the Fed's policymaking space. The Fed's metamorphosis over the
last century demonstrates how a law's text gets displaced by its implementation.
This is not to say that norms and conventions, as opposed to formal law, are
doing all the work of creating independence-although the Fed provides
examples of these kinds of "soft constraints," too.13 Instead, the laws of Federal
Reserve independence demonstrate the iterative, interactive conversation
between formal law, modern practice, and historical change. In this sense, the
"institutions" of the Article's title follow and extend Douglass North and others
in the New Institutional Economics literature.14 This dynamic between policy,
13. See Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study of Soft Constraints, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming), http://ssm.com/abstract-2484047.
14. See, e.g., Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on
the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989). For an excellent overview of the New Institutional
Economics and law, see Ron Harris, Legal Scholars, Economists, and the Interdisciplinary Study of
Institutions, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 789 (2011).
261
Yale Journal on Regulation
law, and history is "institutional" in that it is part of a broader array of "humanly
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction" that
"consist[s] of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions,
and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights),"
as North described.15 But the Fed's independence shows us something more:
some of the institutional changes at the heart of the Fed's independence do not
reach the level of "humanly devised constraints," but are at times the product of
history's contingencies and unintended consequences.
The implications of the Article for legal theory, then, are notjust to illustrate
the chasm between law on the books and law on the ground. The Article invites,
instead, a careful analysis of the relationship between the two: the institutional
development of Fed independence relies on statutory authorization as well as
statutory implementation and the subtle but steady drip of change exerted by
individual personalities, outside forces, and the influence of chance. This lens
warns against a legal theory of agency independence that relies on formal
statutory structure-a conception of agency independence currently favored by
courts. And it warns against overconfidence in the legislature's ability to design
institutions by statute. As Terry Moe famously put it, "American public
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of
politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those
who exercise political power."l6
In place of these alternatives, it endorses a view that takes into account law,
politics, and history, almost a view of institutions that relies on "complete,
totalized contingency" of historical events.'7 The idea is not that law is irrelevant
in designing institutions; indeed, the Article argues at length that law is an
essential part of that story. The argument is that law takes on a life of its own
through the lived experience of institution building. The interaction between the
statute and these "totalized contingencies" tell the fuller story of the Fed's
institutional design better than the standard, statute-based accounts.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the existing academic
accounts of central bank and agency independence, including their reliance on
the unchallenged assumption that law is central in creating that independence.
The Article then evaluates the three primary legal mechanisms that scholars
have relied on to explain Fed independence and, conversely, accountability:
budgetary independence (Part II), long tenures of Governors and short tenures of
Fed Chairs (Part III), and removability protection (Part IV). A brief conclusion
suggests how this descriptive account of the laws of Fed independence might
15. Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 97, 97 (1991).
16. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989) ("American public
bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of politics, and its design reflects
the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power.").
17. Christopher Tomlins, What Is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm After Critique?




affect our conceptions of central bank design and how a better understanding of
the Fed's institutional evolution can help guide future policy discussions about
the Fed's governance, structure, and what is meant by "Fed independence" in the
first place.
I. The Existing Accounts of Fed Independence
The standard account of Fed independence goes omething like this. The
Fed's independence is the statutory separation-that is, the separation designated
by statute, in this case the Federal Reserve Act-between the President and the
Fed Chair for the purposes of monetary policy, usually meaning price stability.
The separateness is needed, under this account, because the President's electoral
orientation-his need to either face the national electorate or ensure his successor
wins the next election for policy continuity and legacy building-will induce him
to goose the economy artificially by printing money and causing consequent
inflation, at a long-term cost to the economy. In technical terms, we face a time
inconsistency problem: our short-term interests in inflation-based prosperity are
in tension with long-term interests in avoiding the economic devastation that this
inflation brings.18 Central bank independence resolves that problem, allowing us
to pursue a long-term policy-price stability--even in the face of short-term
pressures from the other direction.
Here is where the metaphors of Fed independence begin: central bank
independence is our Ulysses contract. It lashes the politicians (usually the
President) to the mast to give society the outcome that everyone would ultimately
prefer, but that is very hard to achieve because so many in society are singing
seductively about the virtues of running the printing press to provide monetary
stimulus. Thus relieved of the pressures of navigating the difficulties of
inconsistent preferences, the politicians hire central bankers (usually the Fed
Chair) as the oarsmen, shuts their ears with bees' wax, and the central bankers/
oarsmen then guide the ship of the economy outside of the short-term temptations
for artificial prosperity and toward the destination of price stability and moderate
growth. The binds on the politicians and the wax in the central bankers' ears are
both created by law. To invoke the other metaphors of central bank
independence, we separate central bankers from the political process so that they
263
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can "take away the punch bowl just when the party is getting started,"l9 or "lean
against the winds of deflation or inflation, whichever way they are blowing." 20
The four components of this standard account are thus that the statute is
doing the work here, that the President is the main external pressure on the Fed,
that the Chair is the metonymic equivalent of the Federal Reserve System, and
that purpose of Fed independence is to achieve price stability. While the standard
account goes some distance to specify what is meant by "Fed independence," it
also fails to capture the complexity of the Fed's structure and functions in a way
that can impede serious discussion of central bank design.
This Article focuses on only one element of that account: the focus on the
Federal Reserve Act as the means by which Fed independence is accomplished.
In order to understand why this part of the standard account is wrong, we first
must understand the traditional ways that scholars have talked about the Fed's
independence and institutional design. This Part provides that summary.
A. Alternate Approaches to Evaluating Fed Independence: Law, Economics,
and Political Science
The conventional explanation for Fed independence is that monetary policy
is necessarily a politically controversial exercise.2 1 Under the classic
formulation, creditors prefer to see higher interest rates and lower inflation;
debtors prefer to see lower interest rates and higher inflation. It is the authority
to adjust these interest rates-which influences how much it costs the
19. William McChesney Martin, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Address before the New York Group of the Investment Bankers Association of America 12 (Oct. 19,
1955), http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/historical/martin/martin55_1019.pdf. Note that Martin himself
was quoting an unnamed contemporaneous ource. But he was in any event fond of metaphors. In an
interview, he described the Fed's aspiration for money and credit to:
flow ... like a stream. This stream or river is flowing through the fields of business and com-
merce. We don't want the water to overflow the banks of the stream, flooding and drowning
what is in the fields. Neither do we want the stream to dry up, and leave the fields parched.
Interview, U.S. News & World Rep., Feb 11, 1955, at 56; see also KETTL, supra note 2, at 83 (citing the
interview).
20. Nomination of William McChesney Martin, Jr.: Hearing before S Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 84th Cong. 5 (1956) (statement by William McChesney Martin, Jr.); KETTL, supra
note 2, at 83 (citing hearing testimony). I thank Erika Wayne for the help in locating this source.
21. See, e.g., Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Speech to the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies International Conference (May 25, 2010). Again, note that the Article focuses on the
Fed as regulator of the dollar. Elsewhere, I go into more detail about the relationship between Fed
independence and the Fed's other missions, including bank regulation, bank supervision, systemic risk
regulation, and supervision of the payment system. See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 10, ch. 4. This Article
does not assume a background understanding in the operations of monetary policy, but it does refer to
some ways in which that policy has evolved. For thorough, yet still accessible explanations of monetary
policy, see STEPHEN AXILROD, THE FEDERAL RESERVE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOw 41-64
(2013); and BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES
& FUNCTIONS 27-51 (2005) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS].
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government to service its debt, Jane Doe to pay for a mortgage or student loans,
and the relative attractiveness of investments in the stock market-that makes
the decisions and institutional design of the Fed so controversial. Society must
be able to assume that those monetary levers are pulled for reasons other than a
politician's desire to inflate away the public debt or to cater to some electoral
interest.
The debate regarding why politicians would ever cede even partial control
over the money-regulating process-in other words, why politicians would ever
create independent central banks-is ongoing.22 So too is the debate over to what
end the regulation of money is ceded to central banks, whether price stability,
economic growth/employment regulation, systemic risk regulation, or some
combination of these.2 3 The Article will leave to the side these debates, and
instead focus on the mechanics of independence. In other words, how is that
independence accomplished and maintained?24
There are three literatures that provide insight into this question: agency
independence in legal theory, central bank independence in economics and
political science, and structure and process theory in political science. All three
are useful starting points for the present inquiry, and this Article builds on each.
But all three focus on different questions than the how of agency independence.
For example, legal theory is concerned in part with the constitutional contours of
appointment and removability; economists studying CBI concerned with the
empirical consequences of legal separation between central banks and the fiscal
policymaker; and structure-and-process theory on the consequences that specific
features of institutional design have on agency performance. And even when they
focus on the mechanics of Fed independence, they miss the nuances of the
broader institutional framework by focusing on the statute as written. Thus, while
these accounts of Fed "independence" provide an essential starting point for
understanding the space within which the Fed makes policy, they do not provide
the full story of that space.
22. For interesting assessments of the why question, compare Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1998), which argues that
CBI is a means by which interest groups that have benefitted from rent-extracting political deals secure
price stability to lock in the benefits of those deals, with WILLIAM BERNHARD, BANKING ON REFORM 11
(2002), which argues that CBI resolves an intraparty conflict over the practice of monetary policy.
23. The focus of the debate most recently has been on whether the Fed's monetary goal
should be the optimization of price stability and maximum employment, or whether the Fed should focus,
as other central banks focus, on price stability alone. For an excellent and thorough overview of the debate,
skewed heavily in favor of the dual mandate, see Fulfilling the Full Employment Mandate: Monetary
Policy & the Labor Market, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.bos.frb.org
/employment2013/agenda.htm. For a more critical assessment, see JOHN B. TAYLOR, FIRST PRINCIPLES:
FtvE KEYS TO RESTORING AMERICA'S PROSPERITY 124-28 (2013).
24. The book from which this Article is drawn goes into much more detail on three
additional questions: What is the Federal Reserve? From whom is the Fed independent in theory and
practice? And what end does Fed independence serve? See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 10.
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1. Agency Independence in Administrative Law
Courts and legal scholars have long analyzed the nature of agency
independence in the context of administrative law. But "agency independence"
in this context is something of a misnomer: as Gersen has noted, agency
independence is a "legal term of art in public law, referring to agencies headed
by officials that the President may not remove without cause. Such agencies are,
by definition, independent agencies; all other agencies are not."2 5 Thus, "agency
independence" is not concerned with agency independence in the generic sense
of that term-not whether the agency can pursue its own agenda without outside
interference, but only whether the President can summarily fire the agency's
head.
Other scholars have documented administrative law's focus on
removability,26 and the doctrinal gist is easily summarized. Congress may not
require the President o seek the Senate's advice and consent prior to removal, as
the "reasonable construction of the Constitution" would forbid that kind of
blending of legislative and executive functions without express authorization.2 7
But Congress may limit Presidential removal of an agency head to a more narrow
range of causes, depending on the nature of the office in question. For offices
that are created to "perform . . . specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial
aid"-that is, independent commissions like the Federal Trade Commission-
the Court has deemed removability conditions on agency heads constitutionally
permissible.28 So too for lower-level executive appointees like independent
counsel,29 but not if the agency head and the lower-level appointee are both
deemed to be protected by statute from being summarily fired by the President.30
The doctrinal summary does not say much about the operational
independence of administrative agencies. We learn only that some kinds of
restrictions are permissible, some are not, and the meaning of agency
independence for the purposes of judicial oversight is wrapped up in the basic
question of whether Congress can restrict the President's ability to fire these
subordinates for any or no reason.31
25. Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 347-48 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010).
26. See Barkow, supra note 8; Huq, supra note 9; Vermeule, supra note 8.
27. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116, 176 (1926), overruled in part by
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
28. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935).
29. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
30. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483-84
(2010).
31. One prominent jurist regards the language of Free Enterprise Fund as more fully
consistent with the sweep of executive power envisioned by Myers than the more skeptical Humphrey's




On their own terms, these cases are controversial to scholars of presidential
authority.3 2 But as a means of evaluating agency independence writ large, the
removability focus is even more susceptible to criticism. That is, leaving aside
questions of whether Congress can ever influence division within a unitary
executive, and focusing instead on the meaning of agency independence, the
removability focus captures only part of the agency independence picture. The
rest of the picture requires more explanation.
Because removability provides a narrow picture of the features of agency
independence, there has been a chorus of criticism arguing against the judicial
conception of agency independence as a function of removability protections.33
Scholars contend that the paradigm. focuses on the wrong mechanisms of
independence;" ignores the ways in which executive agencies-those whose
heads are removable at will-use presidential review to increase "self-
insulation;"35  creates meaningless distinctions between executive and
independent agencies;" focuses on the wrong problems3 7 and the wrong
parties; 3 8 reflects a misunderstanding of how the administrative state actually
functions;39 elides the other ways, unrelated to removability, in which the
32. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). For a conflicting view, see, for example,
Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory ofthe Executive, 91 B.U. L. Rev.
273 (2011). Interestingly, two proponents of the unitary executive theory have, in footnotes, come to
opposite conclusions about the FOMC's constitutionality. Compare John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 850 n.173 (2009) ("While
we believe that the appropriate precedent rules do not protect the decisions that allow the creation of
independent agencies from being overruled (assuming as we believe that they conflict with the original
meaning), one important exception may exist to this claim. We are inclined to believe that the
independence of the Federal Reserve is now so well accepted that it should be regarded as an entrenched
precedent."), with Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 86 n.150 (1994) ("The independence of the Federal Reserve, and of the money supply,
provides by far the hardest case for me. Nonetheless, I would note that practical independence can always
be achieved within our formal constitutional structure if public opinion thinks it desirable that it should
exist. Presidents who fire Watergate special prosecutors or who appoint their campaign managers to be
Attorney General rapidly learn that the public has no patience with politicized law enforcement. For this
reason, I do not believe we need an independent counsel law in this country to protect against partisan
interference with the law enforcement machinery. Similarly, I do not believe we need an independent
Federal Reserve Board to protect against presidential manipulation of the money supply. Our best
protection against that evil comes from an informed public opinion about the nature of money, and, in the
absence of that, statutory guarantees of agency 'independence' have proven to be of very little use.").
33. But see Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control,
65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014).
34. See Barkow, supra note 8; Bressman & Thompson, 607-612, supra note 9;
Vermeule, supra note 8.
35. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L.
REv. 1755 (2013).
36. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013).
37. See Barkow, supra note 8.
38. M. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032 (2011).
39. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. (2012).
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President controls independent agencies;40 and gives courts the power to review
political decisions that are fundamentally incompatible with judicial review.4 1
Vermeule summarizes the point well. Identifying a "mismatch" between "the
doctrinal law as embodied in judicial decisions and the revealed behavior of
political actors," he notes that "the legal test that courts deem central to agency
independence is neither necessary nor sufficient for operative independence in
the world outside the courtroom. The legal test . . . does not capture the
observable facts of agency independence in the administrative state."42
The Federal Reserve's independence illustrates the reasons why some
scholars are frustrated with removability as the paradigm for evaluating agency
independence, as some scholars have noted.43 There is simply more to the
Federal Reserve Act than removability, and in the case of the Federal Reserve
System, removability is less straightforward than it may first appear.
2. Central Bank Independence in Economics
Although legal scholars have mostly either ignored the Fed or analyzed it
in conjunction with other agencies of very different stripes, economists and
political scientists44 have long focused on central banks and central banking.45
40. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 9.
41. Huq, supra note 9.
42. Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1168.
43. Vermeule, supra note 8.
44 The political science literature on central banking takes a view that is largely distinct
from that of economics. Scholars have puzzled over why politicians would willingly cede control over
monetary policy, an area that arguably has outsized impact on the politicians' own electoral interests. For
the most innovative interest-group theories, see Miller, supra note 22; and John Goodman, The Politics of
Central Bank Independence, 23 COMP. POLS. 323, 339 (1993), which argues that interest groups can
influence politicians to adopt CBI because the politicians do not expect to be in power by the time the
negative electoral consequences of more conservative monetary policy arise. William Bernhard provides
an explicitly electoral theory, arguing that CBI is in the long-term interests of both executive-branch and
legislative-branch coalition partners, though for different reasons. The legislative branch sees central bank
independence as a monitoring device for ensuring that the monetary policy decisions of the executive are
not inappropriately prejudicial to the electoral prospects of legislatures. The executive branch will agree,
because failure to do so may result in what Bernhard calls "legislative punishment," the myriad ways in
which legislators can punish the executive for failures to pursue policies sympathetic to their electoral
interests. The most damaging form of legislative punishment is the withdrawal of coalitional support,
which can diminish the executive's own electoral prospects. See BERNHARD, supra note 22, at 2; William
Bernhard, A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence, 92 AM. POL. SC. REV.
311 (1998). Bernhard's BANKING ON REFORM, supra note 22, also provides perhaps the single best
introduction into the design questions associated with political scientists' CBI inquiries.
45. For a full review of the extensive literature linking CBI to monetary policy, see
CARL E. WALSH, MONETARY THEORY AND POLICY 419-24 (2d ed. 2003). Note, however, that he policy
outcome that most of these studies analyze is inflation, not economic growth. Indeed, two influential
studies suggest that there is no significant relationship between economic growth and CBI. See Alberto
Alesina & Lawrence Summers, Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some
Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 151 (1993); Jakob de Haan & Willem J. Kooi,
Does Central Bank Independence Really Matter? New Evidence for Developing Countries Using a New
Indicator, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 643 (2000). Some scholars also view this literature as composed of two
competing literatures: a theoretical branch that focuses on why CBI would or would not produce better




Interestingly, although this Central Bank Independence (CBI) literature rarely
overlaps with the agency independence literature summarized above, their
conceptions of independence are strikingly similar. While the term
"independence" in the CBI context has meant "different things to different
people,"46 the focus, as with agency independence, is on law: "practically all
existing attempts at the systematic characterization of [central bank]
independence rely solely on legal aspects of independence."4
Conceptually, CBI focuses on answering the consequences of
independence rather than its mechanics. But not completely. Stanley Fischer's
now-famous articulation divides CBI between "goal independence" and
"instrument independence."48 Goal independence refers to the freedom to select
the ends of monetary policy; instrument independence is the freedom to select
the means of pursuing statutorily specified goals.
Fischer's formulation has been, for the most part, the last word on those
mechanical questions.4 9 And there, the focus is mostly on the statute.o It is the
de Haan, The European Central Bank: Independence, Accountability, and Strategy, 93 PUB. CHOICE 395,
396 (1997).
46. BERNHARD, supra note 22, at 19. For examples of the work engaging CBI at
different definitional levels summarized here, see de Haan, supra note 45; James Forder, Central Bank
Independence: Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment, 50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 307 (1998);
Gabriel Mangano, Measuring Central Bank Independence: A Tale ofSubjectivity and offts Consequences,
50 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 468 (1998); Henriette Prast, Commitment Rather Than Independence: An
Institutional Design for Reducing the Inflationary Bias of Monetary Policy, 49 KYKLOS 377 (1996); and
Christopher Waller, Performance Contracts for Central Bankers, 77 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis
REv. 5 (1995).
47. ALEX CUKIERMAN, CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY AND INDEPENDENCE
371 (1992) (collecting sources); see, e.g., Alesina & Summers, supra note 45, at 153 (listing mechanisms,
all legal, that separate central banks from political interference); see also LASTRA, BANK REGULATION,
supra note 7, at 12 (discussing legal and non-legal aspects of central bank independence). Indeed, one
recent effort criticizes the CBI literature as being insufficiently focused on rules. See Andreas Freytag,
Does Central Bank Independence Reflect Monetary Commitment Properly? Methodological
Considerations, PSL Q. REV. (2012).
48. Stanley Fischer, Central-Bank Independence Revisited, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 201
(1995).
49. For an exception, see Ricardo Reis, Central Bank Design, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 17
(2013). Reis explores more about the mechanics of central bank design, but, once again, the focus is on
legislation.
50. A partial exception is Lastra's taxonomical effort. Lastra orients her discussion of
CBI around mechanisms of independence, which she refers to as "safeguards," that come in three varieties:
"organic, functional, and professional." LASTRA, BANKING REGULATION, supra note 7. Organic and
functional safeguards echo the legal separations that form the basis of economists' empirical models of
CBI; organic safeguards refer to "the legal safeguards directed towards the organization of the central
bank and to its institutional relationships with the government," and include mechanisms such as
appointment, terms of office, dismissal, salary, prohibitions on central bankers while in office,
prohibitions on central bankers after they leave office, and liaisons with the Treasury. Id at 12, 27-36.
Functional safeguards refer to legislative restrictions on "the functions of the central bank and the scope
of the powers entrusted to it." Id. at 12. "Professional" safeguards are part of what Lastra calls "de facto"
independence, and is determined by: the personalities of the governor and the minister of finance (and in
some countries of other high officials), the political and economic circumstances (e.g., economic
expansion or recession); the history and national priorities of the country concerned; the depth and quality
of monetary analysis; the rate of turnover of central bank governors and other factors. Id. As will be seen
throughout the rest of the Article, individual personalities play an extremely important role. Similarly,
Cukierman acknowledges these limitations. See CUKIERMAN, supra note 47, at 371-72 For representative
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law, passed by Congress and recorded in the U.S. Code, which establishes the
"goals" of central banking. It is law, passed and recorded, that provides the
freedom to select the "instruments" of central banking. And it is the law that
empirical economists cite when they attempt to determine the extent of the Fed's
independence and the correlation between that independence and economic
indicators such as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment. As Alex
Cukierman, perhaps the leading empiricist of CBI, has explained it with admitted
reservation: when constructing "indices of legal aspects of CB independence,"
the emphasis is on "only the written information from the [statutes]."s"
The question remains whether these assumptions about law and statutes-
at least as applied to the Federal Reserve-are correct.52
3. Central Bank Independence in Political Science
Political scientists who have studied agency design have explored more
than other disciplines the actual contours of the administrative state. Even so,
they have, for the most part, focused on law as the primary mechanism in that
design.
An earlier generation of scholars of the bureaucracy took the view that
delegation was abdication: that by delegating responsibility to agencies,
Congress created a "headless fourth branch" that controlled governmental
decision-making without accountability. But in the 1980s and 1990s, Matthew
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast-collectively, McNollGast- 54and
other scholars55 renewed the confidence in congressional design, showing that
work in the genres of central bank memoirs and histories that are sensitive to the role of personality, see
MARRINER S. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS: PUBLIC AND PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS (1951); ALAN
GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD (2007); KETTL, supra note 2;
and LAURENCE H. MEYER, A TERM AT THE FED (2008).
51. CUKIERMAN, supra note 47, at 371.
52. This approach may be open to the kind of criticism lodged by social scientists in a
related dispute about legal inputs and economic outputs. The "Law and Finance" literature found a strong
positive correlation between the common law and economic growth, but legal scholars immediately and
almost uniformly rejected the result. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998). The economists were undeterred on epistemological grounds: "Lawyers don't do empirical work.
They just argue with each other." Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb.
2005, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/featurethompsonjanfeb05.msp. It
should be noted, however, that a lawyer-economist may have had the last word. See Holger Spamann, The
"Antidirector Rights Index" Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUDS. 467 (2010) (comprehensively calling into
question the econometric determinations based on the categorization of law in thirty-three of the forty-six
counties originally analyzed by La Porta et al.).
53. See Gersen, supra note 25, at 339. For more discussion of the "headlessness"
phenomenon, see LOUIs FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 148
(4th ed. 1998).
54. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 165 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins,
Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
55. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of




Congress can shape the goals and behavior of agencies through the way it
structures them. This work came to be known as the "structure and process"
approach to agency control. As Gersen summarizes, "[a]lthough t e structure and
process thesis now has many variants, its simplest form asserts that legislatures
can control agency discretion (policy outcomes) by carefully delineating the
process by which agency policy is formulated."56
The structure-and-process theorists focused on the variety of mechanisms
through which Congress might assert control over agencies-including, but
going but far beyond, the removability framework on which lawyers and judges
rely. The focus of structure-and-process theory is therefore inherently on
institutional design, whether it stems from Congress's" ex ante legislative
decisions as institutional designer or more broadly on, well, the structures and
processes associated with a given agency.
The structure-and-process thesis is an important extension of the narrow
focus on removability in administrative law. And in many ways, the new work
in administrative law scholarship challenging the judicial conception of agency
independence is either expressly or impliedly a subset of the structure-and-
process thesis.
But the focus in this context, as in administrative law and CBI, remains on
law. The main areas of discussion are the nature of Presidential review of agency
work product;58 threats and practices of auditing;5 9 limits on jurisdiction;o and
the expansiveness of the wording of authorizing statutes.6' Largely missing from
structure-and-process analysis is the role of non-statutory legal change-how the
law in its implementation can upend, even replace, the statutory design.
B. A New Approach to Federal Reserve Independence
The literatures of agency independence and central bank independence
provide essential elements to the framework for evaluating Fed independence,
including their close attention to the Federal Reserve Act underlies that
independence. Where those alternatives go wrong, though, is in their assumption
that law is not simply the beginning of the inquiry, but the end. Structure-and-
56. Gersen, supra note 25, at 339.
57. Even here, though, the focus may well be on Congress as standing metonymically
for the President, Congress, and other groups that participate in the legislative process.
58. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245 (2001);
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO.
L.J. 1337 (2013).
59. E.g., Jeffrey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing, 33 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 670 (1989).
60. E.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REv. 201; Macey, supra note 55.
61. See generally JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION?:
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002).
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process theory goes much further, but generally does not focus on central banks62
and lacks an account of the law's historical evolution. This Article is an effort to
provide that account in the context of our central bank.
To be clear, the flawed assumption in this previous scholarship does not
eliminate its value. In many cases, these literatures aim to assess the President's
and Congress's constitutional prerogatives to shape the institutional design of the
administrative state; or to establish a theory for testing the efficacy and
implications of a central bank's separation from specific governmental
organizations; or the use of law to accomplish some end desired by Congress,
interest groups, or the President. In that sense, the literatures cannot be criticized
for failing to take a more comprehensive view of Fed independence; that view
was not a part of, or required for, that research.
But if judges and scholars aim to evaluate the ways that a "headless fourth
branch" can exist outside the traditional structure of government, as many critics
in the judiciary and the academy have expressed,63 or to quantify and evaluate
claims that the Federal Reserve is or is not independent of other governmental
actors or organizations, then the law-based approach to independence is
insufficient. The nearly exclusive focus on the words of a law fails to engage
with the law's statutory and historical context and evolution. This is especially
true in the judicial evaluation of agency independence, which is often focused on
the removability of the Chair.64
But even a broader focus on a variety of legal mechanisms would be
inadequate. Extralegal sources also circumscribe agency activities in a variety of
ways. Here, Vermeule's argument about conventions is important to keep in
mind: conventions are distinct from law, but shape the way that institutional
independence manifests and evolves.65  To effectively evaluate Fed
62. For an excellent exception, see CHRISTOPHER ADOLPH, BANKERS, BUREAUCRATS,
AND CENTRAL BANK POLITICS: THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY (2013).
63. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) ("The collection
of agencies housed outside the traditional executive departments, including the Federal Communications
Commission, is routinely described as the 'headless fourth branch of government,' reflecting not only the
scope of their authority but their practical independence."); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 525-26 (2009) ("There is no reason to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the
Headless Fourth Branch by letting Article III judges-like jackals stealing the lion's kill-expropriate
some of the power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive." (internal citation omitted)).
Among scholars, the defenders of the unitary executive criticize Humphrey's-type restrictions on
removability for empowering the full independence of the administrative state. See, e.g., CALABRESI &
Yoo, supra note 32, at 3-4.
64. As summarized earlier in the Article, other scholars evaluating agency
independence have looked beyond removability and focused on term length, funding sources, discretion
to choose policy instruments, work product review, and more. LASTRA, BANKING REGULATION, supra
note 7; Barkow, supra note 8; Bressman & Thompson, supra note 9; Datla & Revesz, supra note 36.
65. Vermeule argues that law, politics, and conventions animate the ways that agencies
experience and the political branches regulate agency independence. To establish this taxonomy,
Vermeule draws on the understanding of conventions from Commonwealth systems, where conventions
are "(1) regular patterns of political behavior (2) followed from a sense of obligation." Each element of
the definition can take stronger or weaker forms, but one of Vermeule's main points is that these
conventions dictate individual (and institutional) behavior, even though they are not a core part of the law.




independence, scholars and policymakers must be sensitive to these kinds of
nonlegal mechanisms.6 6 Even still, informal constraints that become customary
or conventional are only part of the picture. A contextual understanding of the
law's history and evolution is another element that contributes to institutional
independence, even when this evolution is ongoing and conventions are not yet
solidified. This Article is the story of that ongoing process.
II. The Curious Case of the Fed's Budgetary Independence
The power of the purse is one of the primary means of Congressional
control over agencies. That power is a unique and often misconstrued aspect of
Congress's relationship with the Fed, because the Fed has the ability to fund itself
from the proceeds of open market operations that it controls without interference
from the political branches. Part II discusses this largely uncharted statutory and
historical framework. This budgetary independence is not uncharted because it
is unacknowledged. To the contrary, the Fed includes on its own website and in
its detailed annual reports a frank admission that the System's "income comes
primarily from the interest on government securities that it has acquired through
open market operations."67 Instead, the story is an interesting one because of the
interplay between the current budgetary practice and the statutory language
authorizing this practice, separated as they are by a century of dramatic change
in monetary policy. As a result, although this feature of the Federal Reserve Act
has been widely cited as a defining characteristic of Fed independence, the space
between the Act and the current practice has caused scholars to mislabel or
incorrectly analyze the Fed's budgetary independence every time it has been
addressed.
This Part provides the first analysis of Fed budgetary independence based
in both law and history. It illustrates how legal and non-legal institutions interact
to increase the distance between Congress and the Fed. It explains the
extraordinary nature of the Fed's budgetary independence, stemming from the
ability to create the money with which it funds itself. And it reveals the evolution
from an authority strictly circumscribed by law (still on the books) and practice
(long since abandoned). The Fed's budgetary independence demonstrates the
role of historical contingency and external changes in making a legal mechanism
66. Vermeule recommends that judges take note of the conventions of independence
when adjudicating the traditional removability cases. Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1194. Huq would
disagree, and argues that courts have no place in making these kinds of determinations in the first place.
Huq, supra note 9. While this Article does not wade too deeply into that doctrinal debate, the analysis
here suggests judges will have difficulty fitting independence into any given constitutional framework:
courts are not institutionally well-suited to make sense of the nonlegal institutions that shape agency
independence.
67. Current FA Qs: What does it mean that the Federal Reserve is "independent within
the government"?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs
/about_12799.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Current FAQs].
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of independence look very different from the independence that is lived in the
world of central banking.
A. The Structure ofFed Budgetary Independence
The Federal Reserve is the only truly autonomous budgetary entity in the
entire federal government, including Congress and the President.8 To
understand this dynamic, one must first understand how the rest of the federal
government is funded, and compare it to the unique budgetary independence of
the Federal Reserve.
There are three primary forms of funding for governmental entities. First,
the vast majority of institutions-from Congress to the Courts to the White
House, and most agencies, institutions, programs, and commissions in
between-are funded through Congress's annual appropriations process.
Second, most of the government's actual expenditures are part of the
government's mandatory commitments.69 These include entitlement programs
such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other forms of direct
assistance; some kinds of disaster relief; and interest on the national debt. And
third, some governmental agencies, including the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the now-defunct Office of Thrift
Supervision, are funded through the fees assessed against their own regulated
entities.70
And then there is the Fed. The Fed funds itself with a portion of the proceeds
from its open-market operations, or the purchase and sale of assets on the open
market. In the Fed's own words, from the most recent budget report,
[t]he major sources of income were interest earnings from the portfolio of U.S.
government securities ($49.0 billion) and federal agency mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) ($31.4 billion) in the System Open Market Account. Earnings in
excess of expenses, dividends, and surplus are transferred to the U.S. Treasury-
in 2012, a total of $88.4 billion.71
The Fed also receives income for "priced services" provided to private
banks, which include the cost of transporting and printing new currency, check
68. Congress could always legislate o create its own money; but then, of course, it
would first have to legislate to create its own money. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 5. The Fed faces no such
barrier.
69. These outlays are not truly mandatory, since Congress retains the ability to repeal
them. The question is, instead, whether they must be reinitiated each year, as is the case with the rest of
the federal budget. For more on Social Security funding, see 3 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 15-282 (3d ed. 2008).
70. For a thorough overview of these various types of funding structures, see id. at 15-
120-15-132.
71. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET





clearing, and other services related to currency distribution and the general
payment system.72
Some scholars have supposed that the Fed, like some other banking
regulators, funds itself through assessments on private banks.73 While it is true
that the Fed collects money from member banks for "priced services,"74 those
assessments cover just 8.4% of its expenses.75 The rest comes from the proceeds
from its open-market operations.
The Fed not only funds itself largely from the proceeds of its substantial
assets, but it can also create money in pursuit of its policy objectives. As a result,
the Fed's funding structure is without parallel in the federal government. The
Fed conducts monetary policy by, among other options, creating money. With
this money, it can buy government-and, more recently, non-government7 6
securities.77 These interest-bearing assets generate money that the agency can
subsequently use to fund itself.78 The Fed thus has the ability to create from
scratch the money it eventually uses to pay its employees, fund its conferences,
and renovate its buildings.
B. Statutory Basis for Fed Budgetary Independence
The Fed's budgetary independence is therefore unequaled in the federal
government. But here is the striking reality about this independence: Congress
never expressly authorized it. That relevant section of the Federal Reserve Act
grants the Board of Governors the "power to levy semiannually upon the Federal
reserve banks in proportion to their capital stock and surplus, an assessment
72. Id. at 9.
73. See Barkow, supra note 8.
74. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., supra note 71, at 9.
75. Id.
76. See Statement Regarding Transactions in Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities and
Treasury Securities, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org
/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_120913.html.
77. See THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 21.
78. Chair Bernanke has contested a "money-printing" characterization of the Fed's
monetary authority. See Interview by Scott Pelley with Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560162-7114229.html ("One myth
that's out there is that what we're doing is printing money. We're not printing money. The amount of
currency in circulation is not changing. The money supply is not changing in any significant way."). This
is a factually accurate but conceptually misleading point aimed at controlling a debate not directly relevant
to our discussion. Bernanke is of course correct hat the Fed's monetary policy framework is based on
extensions of bank reserves, not the increase of paper currency-unlike, say, the Reichsbank's stunning
printing bonanza during the hyperinflation of the 1920s in Weimar Germany, see LIAQUAT AHAMED,
LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 20-25 (2009). Technically, then, the Fed is
not printing money at all, but rather filling the banking system with additional reserves, in return for which
the Fed receives income-generating bonds. The inflationary effects of these policies are hotly disputed,
but that the Fed can create the money with which it buys interest-bearing bonds is uncontested. It can
"print" the money it uses to implement its monetary policy decisions, and use the proceeds of those
decisions to fund its budget.
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sufficient to pay its estimated expenses and the salaries of its members and
employees for the half year succeeding the levying of such assessment."7 9
Unquestionably, this statutory authorization exempts the Fed from
Congressional appropriations.80 But, on its face, it merely allows the Fed to make
the Reserve Banks pay for its expenses, "in proportion to their capital stock and
surplus."8 ' It does not allow the Fed to create, and fund itself with, its own
Federal Reserve notes.
To understand how this relatively modest statutory authorization
metamorphosed into the Fed's present and complete budgetary independence,
one must understand more about the evolution of the Federal Reserve System
over the past century. Three features are of particular importance: (1) the quasi-
autonomy of the Reserve Banks, which terminated in 1935 when monetary
policy came under the exclusive purview of the newly forged Board of
Governors; (2) the so-called "real bills doctrine;" and (3) the gold standard.
C. The Compromise of 1913 and the Quasi-Autonomy of the Federal Reserve
Banks, 1914-1935
The conventional story of the Fed's creation begins in 1907 with an acute
financial crisis that was eventually resolved through a bailout orchestrated by JP
Morgan. As the story goes, the Panic of 1907 made bankers and politicians wary
of continued reliance on the private bailout model. The Federal Reserve System
was the political response to their concerns.82
This story is technically, but deceptively, true. It is deceptive because it
links, almost ineluctably, the Panic of 1907 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
For the purposes of understanding how the Fed's budgetary independence came
to be, making this uncritical link is a mistake. The Panic of 1907 occurred in,
well, 1907, and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 in 1913. The six years in
between were extraordinarily important for the fate of the Federal Reserve
79 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2012).
80. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE'S ACTIONS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (2010) (noting that the Fed is not subject
to the appropriations process and it is able to operate independently from government influence).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 243. Interestingly, this aspect of the statute may well be affirmatively
inconsistent with the Fed's practice. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is responsible for
effectuating the FOMC's monetary policy decisions. The annual report does not make clear on whose
balance sheet the proceeds of open market operations reside-whether the FRBNY's, or the Board's, or
the twelve Reserve Banks equally. Presumably, those proceeds either belong directly to the Board or are
shared in proportion to the Reserve Banks' capital stock.
82. See Katharina Pistor, Towards a Legal Theory of Finance 26 (Columbia Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 434, 2012), http://ssm.com/abstract-2178066 ("Mr. JP Morgan was able to
coordinate a private sector rescue of the U.S. financial system in 1907, but only because relative to the
capacity of the private entities involved in the rescue its size was still manageable. The crisis raised
sufficient concerns about the reliability of private sector bailouts to provide the political impetus for a new
central bank, the Federal Reserve, established in 1913."); see also ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR,
THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MARKET'S PERFECT STORM 2 (2009) ("Though the
duration of the crisis was relatively brief, the repercussions proved far-reaching, resulting in the formal




System, as they included two Congressional elections in which Democrats seized
control first of the House (in 1910)83 and then the Senate (in 1912).8' Most
important, the presidential election of 1912-a four-way race between
incumbent Republican President William Howard Taft, erstwhile Republican
former President Theodore Roosevelt, Socialist Eugene Debs, and Democratic
New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson-was one of the most significant
elections in American history. In the words of one historian, the 1912 election
"verged on political philosophy."85 That philosophical moment intervened
between the Panic and the Act in ways that were essential to the ultimate shape
the System took.
On a basic level, the elections mattered because they shifted partisan
control. The first proposals following the Panic of 1907 were entirely
Republican; the final bill was almost exclusively Democratic.8 6 Of the
Republicans, Senator Nelson Aldrich led the monetary reform efforts. In 1908,
Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, which created the National Monetary
Commission with Aldrich at the head.87 The Commission imagined a structure
very different from the system that the Federal Reserve Act eventually created.
That structure, the National Reserve Association (NRA), 8 was to be a mix of
public and private appointments, dramatically weighted toward the private. For
example, the board of the NRA was to have forty-six directors, forty-two of
whom-including the Governor and his two deputies-were to be appointed
directly and indirectly by the banks, not by the government.89
The election of 1912 capped a change of the guard in the House, Senate,
and White House, and the Democrats made the cause of monetary reform their
own. The key consequence of this political transformation was what might be
called the Compromise of 1913. The two major results of that Compromise were
the creations of the leanly staffed, mostly supervisory Federal Reserve Board,
83. See Office of the Historian, Party Divisions ofthe House ofRepresentatives, 1789-
Present, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2015), http://history.house.gov/lnstitution/Party-
Divisions/Party-Divisions/.
84. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE (2015), https://
www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/oneitem-and-teasers/partydiv.htm. The Congressional and
Presidential elections of 1908 were less important for the shape of the System.
85. JOH1N MILTON COOPER JR., THE WARRIOR AND THE PRIEST: WOODROW WILSON
AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT 141 (1983); see also SYDNEY M. MILKIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE
PROGRESSIVE PARTY, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2009) (discussing the
importance of the election for the political and ideological debates it produced).
86. The vote in the House of Representatives was 298 to 60. Only two Democrats voted
against the bill, whereas 35 Republicans voted in favor. In the Senate, the vote was 43 to 25, with 27 not
voting. The Democrats were unanimous in favor, and all but three Republicans voted against. See A.
JEROME CLIFFORD, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 40 (1965).
87. An Act To Amend the National Banking Laws, ch. 229, 35 Stat. 546 (1908),
repealed by Technical Amendments to the Federal Banking Laws, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2292, 2294 (1994).
88. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1964).
89. See E.W. Kemmerer, The Purposes of the Federal Reserve Act as Shown by Its
Explicit Provisions, 99 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 62, 64 (1922).
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based in Washington, DC, and of the twelve quasi-autonomous "Reserve
Banks," which several active participants in the Act's drafting considered
essentially private institutions.9 0
The Compromise hence incorporated two poles into the Federal Reserve
System-public and private, accountable to the political process and independent
from it. The tension between these poles is essential to understanding the nature
of Fed independence, then and now. Paul Warburg, the German-American
banker whose ideas in the early 1900s set the stage for much of the debate
preceding the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, described it this way: "The
view was generally held that centralization of banking would inevitably result in
one of two alternatives: either complete governmental control, which meant
politics in banking, or control by 'Wall Street,' which meant banking in
politics."91 One of the major debates preceding the passage of the Act centered
on how to navigate those two poles, between the "whirlpool of socialism and the
jagged rocks of monopoly."92
The Democrats chose to navigate the poles by balancing them-by creating,
on the one hand, the government-controlled Federal Reserve Board, and the
private Reserve Banks on the other.9 3 Thanks to these equal and opposite forces,
the System would not, in theory at least, be dominated by either faction.
As a result of this Compromise, the Reserve Banks-not the Federal
Reserve Board-were tasked with the conduct of what we now call monetary
policy. The System was considered a federalist one, with decentralized authority
located in the Reserve Banks. Carter Glass, a zealous guardian of the
Compromise,94 emphasized the federal nature of the Federal Reserve System in
these terms:
90. In fact, the Act allowed for "eight to twelve" Reserve Banks. The exact number
was then decided by the Secretaries of Treasury and Agriculture over the course of the year 1914. Federal
Reserve Act of 1913, sec. 2 (codified in 12 USC § 222).
91. 1 PAUL WARBURG, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH 12
(1930).
92. CLIFFORD, supra note 86, at 21; see also CARTER GLASS, AN ADVENTURE IN
CONSTRUCTIVE FINANCE 112-20 (1927) (discussing the ways in which President Wilson envisioned the
Federal Reserve Board would mediate the interests of government and banks).
93. See Howard Hackley, The Status of the Federal Reserve System in the Federal
Government 31 (1972) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author and the Stanford Law Library)
(citing several sources from the legislative history for the view that the Federal Reserve Board was
intended to be a governmental institution, and the Reserve Banks private corporations). For more details
on the provenance of this extraordinary document, see Peter Conti-Brown, We Have Winners! - and a
Paean to Law Librarians, THE CONGLOMERATE (May 26, 2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/20 1
/05/we-have-winners-and-a-paen-to-law-librarians.html.
94. Glass could get emotional about his attachment to the 1913 Federal Reserve
System, he and was deeply hostile to the Board of Governors model that replaced it in 1935. "Next to my
own family," he said, "the Federal Reserve System is nearest to my heart." ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 296 (1960). He challenged those who would claim
credit for its paternity. See GLASS, supra note 92, at 1-15, 37-58 (saying that President Wilson's counselor
wrote a "romance on the subject" of the Fed's founding and called it "history"). Glass's claims are
entertaining but overblown. While his contribution is certain, the original Federal Reserve System was
born of a compromise among ideas from Glass, Paul Warburg, Woodrow Wilson, Nelson Aldrich, and




In the United States, with its immense area, numerous natural divisions, still more
numerous competing divisions, and abundant outlets to foreign countries, there is
no argument, either of banking theory or of expediency, which dictates the
creation of a single central banking institution, no matter how skillfully managed,
how carefully controlled, or how patriotically conducted.95
E.W. Kemmerer, an early observer of the creation of the Fed, called the
arrangement of "twelve central banks with comparatively few branches instead
of one central bank with many branches" the "most striking fact" about the
System.96 Glass shared the view of the Reserve System as a series of central
banks; indeed, he did not view the Federal Reserve Board as in charge of the
central banking aspects of the system at all.97
And so it was that the Reserve Banks became financially autonomous
organizations. Their financial autonomy came because they raised money
through the business of banking for banks: that is, by "discounting," or lending
money at interest, to the member banks within the System. They were not part
of the congressional appropriations process, and they conducted their business
separately from the Federal Reserve Board. In the words of the first Secretary of
the Federal Reserve Board,
The banks, in short, have all those banking powers that are not expressly
mentioned in the Federal Reserve Act or directly implied as having been invested
in the Federal Reserve Board. . . There is nothing, either in the Federal Reserve
Act or in the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, to indicate that the reserve
banks are to be operated in groups or through communication with one another,
resulting in the establishment of a single policy as to detail. Neither is there any
to prevent officers of the Federal Reserve Banks from communicating with one
another, getting such information as can be exchanged by that means, or adopting
their own policies as the circumstances and business needs of each district or of
all appear to require.
who were in charge of selecting the locations of the twelve Reserve Banks). See Ron Chemow, Father of
the Fed, AUDACITY, Fall 1993, at 34-45. For a more thorough, still biased, still overwritten, but less
entertaining account of the Fed's founding, see PAUL WARBURG, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (1930).
These "paternity" disputes say nothing of the Fed's refounding in 1935, the responsibility for which lies
with Marriner Eccles. See Memorandum from Marriner Eccles to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Nov.
3, 1934) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library). My thanks to Sergio Stone for locating a digital
copy of this document. Glass, by then a Senator, was Eccles's sensitive foe. For more on the politics of
the 1935 Act, see CLIFFORD, supra note 86 at 242-45; ECCLES, supra note 50, at 200-29; KETTL, supra
note 2, at 51.
95. H.R. REP. No 63-69, at 12 (1913).
96. Kemmerer, supra note 89, at 64.
97. KETTL, supra note 2, at 32. After the Federal Reserve Board took a stronger hand
in setting discount rates in 1927, Glass sought to clamp down on the Board's authority. For more about
how these kinds of disputes between the Reserve Banks and the original Federal Reserve Board came
about, see CLIFFORD, supra note 86, at 66-67; and 1 ALLAN H. MELTZER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: 1913-1951, at 62-75 (2003).
98. H. PARKER WILLIS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 128 (1915).
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The Reserve Banks, not the Federal Reserve Board, controlled the purse
strings under the original Compromise.
The original assessment provision" of the Federal Reserve Act-which is
identical to the provision in place today, one hundred years later-thus
functioned via a Federal Reserve Board reliant on the Reserve Banks to conduct
its business separately and autonomously. At the time, the Board did not have an
independent open-market operations policy and did not have direct oversight of
private member banks to provide a source of income. The assessment went from
the Reserve Banks' profits (including from the Banks' open market policies) to
the Board, not the Board to the Reserve Banks. And even though the Federal
Reserve Board participated to a limited extent in shaping the tenor of monetary
policy, the reality is that the Reserve Banks could-and did-pursue their own
monetary policies.100
The era of autonomy for the Reserve Banks ended with the passage of the
Banking Act of 1935. The Board gained authority over open-market
operations,1 though the assessment provision remained unchanged.102 During
that early period before the Banking Act, however, there was a separation
between assessment authority and operations authority. The Federal Reserve
Board could assess the Reserve Banks for its expenses, including income
generated through open-market operations. But the Federal Reserve Board could
not dictate the outlines of those operations. There existed, therefore, a separation
between the assessment authority and the operations authority. The Fed in this
early stage thus could not create the money with which it funded itself.
D. Open-Market Operations Under the Gold Standard and Real Bills Doctrine
Even if the Act that Congress passed had left monetary policy to the Board's
discretion from day one, the statutory authority to levy assessments on the
99. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, § 10 (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2012)).
100. MELTZER, supra note 97, at 75-82. This open-market autonomy led to some
interesting natural experiments: for example, the state of Mississippi was divided between different
reserve bank districts, one serviced by the Atlanta Fed, the other by the St. Louis Fed. During the banking
crisis of 1930, the St. Louis Fed practiced the real bills doctrine, which prevented it from lending against
anything but bills of trade; the Atlanta Fed practiced a more Bagehotian form of central banking.
Richardson and Troost exploited that fact to show that the banks in the Atlanta district survived at a higher
rate than those in the St. Louis district. William Troost & Gary Richardson, Monetary Intervention
Mitigated Banking Panics During the Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal
Reserve District Border, 1929-1933, 117 J. POL. ECON. 1031 (2009).
101. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
228 (2012)).
102. Id. An exception is the way in which the govemment treated the funds that came
into the Reserve System, whether via assessment on member banks or from open-market operations. In
1923, the Comptroller General of the United States determined, separate from a franchise tax, that the
"funds collected by the Board by assessments on the Reserve Banks were public funds" subject to various
restrictions and impositions. Hackley, supra note 93, at 7-8. In 1933, however, Congress amended the
statute to liberate the Fed from the government's claim on those funds completely. 12 U.S.C. § 244 ("funds




Reserve Banks would still be different from the authority the Board uses today.
The difference is in the Fed's ability to set the terms of its control of the monetary
system. Under the original system in 1913, there were two significant restrictions
on the Fed's ability to issue currency: the gold standard and the real bills doctrine.
Debating the relative merits of the gold standard, real bills doctrine, or
decentralized central banking is not the point here. The point is only that all three
principles limited the ways in which the Federal Reserve Board could raise its
revenue. The modem Board of Governors does not face these limits. The
consequence is that the Fed can create its own budget using a statutory
authorization from a different era, subject to none of the restraints that existed at
that time. 0 3
To understand this tension, we need to know more about these related
principles, the gold standard and the real bills doctrine. Under the gold standard
in 1913, a nation's central bank had to meet national and international demands
to convert its currency into gold at a specified rate, significantly limiting the
central bank's discretion in determining the value and quantity of its currency.104
Under that regime, neither the Board of Governors nor the original Reserve
Banks had the unlimited power to create the money the Board would assess from
the Reserve Banks, and from which it would pay its own expenses.
So too with the real bills doctrine. Under the real bills doctrine, a central
bank could only accept certain kinds of "bills" for discount, meaning that it could
extend credit and expand the money supply only in response to certain kinds of
collateral. If a bank showed up at its local Federal Reserve Bank and demanded
a loan, the Reserve Bank would need collateral. Under the real bills doctrine, that
collateral had to point to a commercial transaction that had already occurred. It
could not be for a promise for a future transaction. The bill had to be "real." 05
103. There is another fascinating element to the Fed's budgetary independence, and in
particular the ways that these elements interact with other legal and informal mechanisms of
independence. It is the flipside of the Fed's money creation power: what is done with that money on the
back end. Here the Fed is once again transparent; the proceeds of open-market operations, after paying off
the System's expenses, are remitted to the public fisc. But, as Sarah Binder indicates, "the Federal Reserve
Act does not require the Fed to remit profits to Treasury." The practice of remitting the proceeds of open-
market operations to the Treasury follows a similar trajectory of evolution from an original statutory
basis-here expressly abrogated in 1933-as other elements of the Fed's budgetary independence. The
present practice began with a public announcement from the Fed in 1947, and has continued ever since.
Sarah Binder, Would Congress Care ifthe Federal Reserve Lost Money? A Lesson from History, MONKEY
CAGE (Feb. 24, 2013), http://themonkeycage.org/201 3/02/24/would-congress-care-if-the-federal-reserve-
lost-money-a-lesson-from-history/.
104. See BEN BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2012).
105. For more on the intellectual and historical development of the real bills doctrine,
see RICHARD GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNTS: THE EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED
WORLD SINCE 1800 5-6 (2010); and ROBERT CRAIG WEST, BANKING REFORM AND THE FEDERAL
RESERVE, 1863-1923 (1977). While an important limitation on a central bank's management of the money
supply in 1913, the mechanics of the doctrine were difficult to identify with precision. As Friedman and
Schwartz indicate, "the real bills criterion ... provided no effective limit to the amount of money."
Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 88, at 194. This is because of the inherent difficulty in determining
what counts as a "real bill" that a Reserve Bank can permissibly discount. For more on this point, see
Kettl, supra note 2, at 23. As mentioned, not even every Reserve Bank practiced the principle, which has
allowed for some fascinating comparisons between, for example, the Atlanta and St. Louis Reserve Banks,
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The real bills doctrine and the gold standard were seen as essential to the
Federal Reserve Act's legitimacy. The claim that the new "Federal Reserve
Notes" would represent "fiat money" were fighting words at the time that the
new System's critics lodged at it at the time. The colorful Carter Glass is quotable
at length here:
Fiat money! Why, sir, never since the world began was there such a perversion of
terms; and a month ago I stood before a brilliant audience of 700 bankers and
business men in New York City, and there challenged the president of the National
City Bank to name a single lexicographer on the face of the earth to whom he
might appeal to justify his characterization of these notes. I twitted him with the
fact that not 1 per cent of the intelligent bankers of America could be induced to
agree with his definition of these notes, and asked him to name a single financial
writer of the metropolitan press of his own town, to whom he might confidently
appeal to justify his absurd charge. "Fiat money" is an irredeemable paper money
with no specie basis, with no gold reserve, but the value of which depends solely
upon the taxing power of the Government emitting it. This Federal reserve note
has 40 per cent gold reserve behind it, has 100 per cent short-term, gilt edge
commercial paper behind it, which must pass the scrutiny, first, of the individual
bank, next of the regional reserve bank, and finally of the Federal Reserve
Board.106
Note Glass's twin reliance on the forty per cent gold-reserve ratio and the
"short-term, gilt-edge commercial paper." Indeed, the gold standard and real-
bills doctrine were the selling points for the framers of the Fed. It was a perceived
limit on how much money could be raised by the System. Regardless of whether
the real bills doctrine actually provided any limit on which bills could
theoretically be discounted, the point is that (1) some people within the System
perceived such limitations and acted accordingly, and that (2) Congress thought
that it was not granting the Fed an unfettered ability to create money with which
the Fed could then, in turn, fund itself.
Woodrow Wilson felt the same way:
Let bankers explain the technical features of the new system. Suffice it here to say
that it provides a currency which expands as it is needed and contracts when it is
not needed: a currency which comes into existence in response to the call of every
man who can show a going business and a concrete basis for extending credit to
him, however obscure or prominent he may be, however big or little his business
transactions.107
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which each had oversight over different parts of the state of Georgia, but practiced different kinds of
discounting techniques. See Troost & Richardson, supra note 100.
106. 51 CONG. REC. 563 (1913) (statement of Rep. Glass).
107. KETTL, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting President Wilson).
Vol. 32, 2015
Federal Reserve Independence
Thus, Congress authorized the Fed to levy assessments against the Reserve
Banks under a gold standard and real bills regime, where the Reserve Banks
enjoyed autonomy to determine their own monetary policy. This authorization
becomes radically different without the features of that regime. Without
monetary policy rules like the gold standard and real bills doctrine, the Federal
Reserve has complete discretion to determine the extent and value of the size of
its balance sheet. As one historian described it, the "automaticity" of the gold
standard and the real bills doctrine "was expected to reduce the need for specific
guidance by the government."108
Neither the gold standard nor the real bills doctrine survives today. The real
bills doctrine died an informal death in the 1920s.109 The gold standard has a
circuitous history, surviving in fits and starts until the United States formally
withdrew its support for the international gold standard in 1971.110 The limitation
of the gold standard on central banking practice is that the money supply must
be managed with an eye toward long-term balance of international payments.
When one country's gold supply gets so low that market participants can doubt
the convertibility of currency to gold, central-banking theory under the gold
standard requires interest rate increases to attract more gold into the economy,
even if that economy is in recession.
E. Scholarly Engagement with Fed Budgetary Independence
Scholars have long noted that the Fed is not subject to the appropriations
process, and that this status is a source of its independence. Every legal scholar
to have engaged this question, however, has either mischaracterized or failed to
capture the whole story. Some scholars mistakenly claim that the Board is funded
by assessments on member banks."' Others correctly note that the Fed is funded
108. CLIFFORD,supra note 86, at 25.
109. See MELTZER, supra note 97, at 53-56.
110. There is an extensive literature on the historical gold standard. The most accessible
starting point is AHAMED, supra note 78, at 78. For a more academic account of the standard during the
Great Depression, see BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION, 1919-1939(1995). For an accessible recent treatment of the gold standard's resurgence after
World War II, see BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HARRY
DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER (2013). The gold standard is at the core of
the existential criticisms of the Federal Reserve. For the political argument, see RON PAUL, END THE FED
71-75 (2009).
111. Barkow, supra note 8, at 44 ("For example, the Federal Reserve is authorized to
levy assessments against member banks to fund its operating budget."); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem
for the Bulge Bracket: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L. J. 777, 795 n.88 (2010) ("The
FRB . . . funds itself through assessments on member banks and profits from its proprietary trading
activities."); Laurie Leader, The Federal Bank Commission Act: A Proposal to Consolidate the Federal
Banking Agencies, 25 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 475, 492 (1976) ("[T]he operating costs of the Federal Reserve
System are paid through Federal Reserve funds, which constitute an indirect assessment on supervised
banks."); Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 502 n.255 (1995) ("The FRB ... [is] funded through members' fees."); Steven
A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503, 525 (2000) ("The Fed
has the power to assess member banks to supply funds for its operating expenses."); Steven A. Ramirez,
The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE
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by assessments on the Federal Reserve Banks, rather than member banks, but do
not note the role played by proceeds from open-market operations.' 12 Others
correctly note that the Board uses the proceeds from open-market operations, but
then cite the provision that authorizes assessments on the Reserve Banks.113 One
prominent legal scholar and historian has cryptically cited the Reserve Board
assessments provision of the Federal Reserve Act for the conclusion that it
creates a "straightforward accountability system,"I14 although the author does
not explain what that system is or how it promotes accountability.
A more recent article argues that "independent agencies such as the Federal
Reserve ... still 'cannot afford to flout the views of the President,' who continues
to exercise substantial control as a consequence of his effective power of the
purse," without reference to the Fed's unique budgetary independence.'15 In
another article, the authors expressly mention the Fed as having a "significant
interest in securing the goodwill of the President to enlist the chief executive's
aid in budget battles with Congress," despite the Fed's unique budgetary
independence.1 1 6 The explanation is that "[e]ven agencies with an independent
source of funding will have a recurring need for new authority and new sources
of funding that outstrip existing demands."1 17 And while the Fed may well find
itself in a situation where its conventional means of securing funding will be
inadequate, that possibility, if it occurs, seems a flimsy basis for anticipatory
reliance on the President for "aid in budget battles with Congress." The reality is
that the Fed's budgetary independence is extraordinary, based only in part on
statute, and illustrative of how the institutions of Fed independence-legal and
J. ON REG. 313, 350 (2007) ("The Fed is self-funded and obtains its operating revenue through statutorily
authorized assessments on member banks."); Steven A. Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics of the New
Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 540 (2003) ("The Fed has the power to assess member banks to supply
funds for its operating expenses.").
112. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 9, at 611 ("Several of the financial
independent agencies have funding sources, usually from users and industry, which frees them from
dependence on congressional appropriations and annual budgets developed by the executive branch.");
see also id. at 611 n.53 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2006) for the proposition that the "Federal Reserve Board
[is authorized] to levy assessments against Federal Reserve banks in order to pay for operating expenses
and member salaries."); Louis Fisher, Confidential Spending and Governmental Accountability, 47 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 347, 348 (1979) ("The Federal Reserve System, for example, derives funds from
assessments on the Reserve banks.").
113. Dombalagian, supra note 111, at 795 n.88 (2010) ("The FRB ... funds itself
through assessments on member banks and profits from its proprietary trading activities."); Richard J.
Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present To Liberate the Future,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1204 (2009) ("The Board [of Governors] is self-financed by its own financial
transactions."); David C. Stockdale, The Federal Reserve System and the Formation ofMonetary Policy,
45 U. CIN. L. REV. 70, 78 (1976) ("The Federal Reserve ... has never been dependent on congressional
appropriations for its operating funds. All such funds are derived from the interest earned on the System's
holdings of government securities.").
114. Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012); Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REv. 233, 255 (2004).
115. Huq, supra note 9, at 29 (citing Bressman & Thompson, supra note 9, at 633-34).
116. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 9, at 633.




non-legal-interact side by side to create the space within which the Fed
operates. And that is a space that scholars have repeatedly mischaracterized.
F. Conclusion: Implications of the Fed's Budgetary Autonomy
One point should be emphasized, as statements about how the Fed interacts
with its money supply tend to provoke spirited arguments, to put it mildly: There
is nothing secretive or nefarious about the Fed's use of open-market operations
to fund itself. The Fed accounts for its open-market operations in its annual
reports, and it has done so-with varying degrees of transparency-for its entire
one-hundred-year history.'18 Moreover, in a century under intense scrutiny from
market participants and existential critics alike, the Fed has had no major
financial scandal.119 This is an impressive feat for any agency, let alone one that
generates as much controversy as the Fed. Indeed, even when Ben Bemanke, the
former Fed Chairman, flew to far-off conferences in remote towns in South
Korea or the Arctic, he flew commercial.120
This is not to say that the Fed's funding decisions should not be scrutinized.
There are important empirical questions about whether any other agency has
matched the Fed's budget growth, for example. A proper empirical inquiry would
assess whether budget growth of the entire System matches or deviates from the
growth of other agencies. Attention to the variance would also be useful. To take
an example topical in 2013, the "sequester" that required mostly indiscriminate
reductions in agency budgets did not apply to the Federal Reserve.'21 And unlike
non-appropriated agencies funded through market assessments, the Fed is not
subject even to the ebbs and flows of its own assessments. How these realities
affect the Fed's budgetary decisions-from salaries to perquisites to hiring
decisions-are important topics of scholarly inquiry.12 2
Rather than an expos6, the point of this analysis is to explain the way that
the Federal Reserve's funding structure has moved beyond its original
conception. The legal mechanism provided by statute in 1913 removed the Fed
from the annual legislative appropriations process. But the legislative change
away from autonomy for the Reserve Banks, the non-statutory rejection of the
real bills doctrine, and the executive decision to abandon the gold standard have
118. For public access to all of the Fed's annual reports, see the Federal Reserve
Archival System for Economic Research, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=l 17.
119. 2 ALLAN H. MELTZER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1951-1969, at xi
(2010).
120. See NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON
FIRE 208, 273 (2013) (describing far-flung meetings of the world's central bankers and finance ministers
and explaining that the "Fed Chair usually flies commercial; if he were to routinely catch a ride on the
treasury secretary's Air Force jet, it could be seen as compromising the central bank's independence").
121. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 251(a)(2), 125 Stat. 240,
241 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (2012)) (applying only to non-exempt accounts).
122. Some scholars have explored the Fed's potential efforts at maximizing its own
revenue streams. See IRWIN L. MORRIS, CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE: THE
POLITICS OF AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY-MAKING 24 (2000) (collecting and critiquing sources).
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moved away from that originally limited funding apparatus. Whereas the
statutory mechanism anticipates checks on the Fed's ability to create the money
with which it funds itself, the current practice has no such limitation. Scholars
have all but ignored this statutory quirk, and even those who make passing
reference do not engage in legal or historical analysis of its features.12 3
For legal theory, the changing context of the Fed's monetary policy has
given new meaning to an old statutory decision. The Congress in 1935 meant to
separate the Fed's funding from the congressional appropriations process, a
decision that has endured in the text of the Act. But Congress also meant to
provide limits to that non-appropriations funding process. One by one, the
limitations were erased. The statute presents one version of budgetary
independence: one that relies on the good graces of the Reserve Banks, subject
to the gold standard and the real bills doctrine. The budgetary independence that
the Fed enjoys today is very different.
III. The Length of Fed Service: Practical Repeal and Statutory Design
The reciprocal of independence is accountability. The institutional design
of the Federal Reserve System is an effort to balance both. One of the key
statutory instances of that balance is the very long term of the Board Governors
(fourteen years, nonrenewable) and the conversely short term of the Fed Chairs
(four years, renewable).12 4 As the Fed's website explains, "[t]he Federal Reserve,
like many other central banks, is an independent government agency but also one
that is ultimately accountable to the public and the Congress." To this end,
"members of the Board of Governors are appointed for staggered 14-year terms
and the Chairman of the Board is appointed for a four-year term."l25
123. A partial exception is a passing reference in Edward Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 631 (2012). Rubin writes that:
[t]he hyperdepoliticization of the Federal Reserve's monetary control function is further
buttressed by the Fed's freedom from congressional budget control. This is due to a unique
situation that, like the monetary control function, evolved without prior planning. In the course
of its open market operations, the Fed holds large quantities of government securities and
receives the interest payments on these securities. In 2011, these payments amounted to $83.6
billion. The Fed simply returns most of this money to the United States Treasury, but it retains
the amount it needs to finance its own operations-$3.4 billion in 2011. As a result, the Fed
does not need to obtain funding from Congress, and Congress has thereby relinquished its ability
to control the Fed through reductions, or threatened reductions, of its annual budgetary
allocation. Like its control of the money supply by committee, and the deference it receives
during the semi-annual oversight hearings, the Fed's ability to fund itself could be readily
reversed. Instead, Congress has followed the course of action to which it committed itself when
these practices developed.
Id. at 668 (emphasis added). Note, though, that Rubin does not explain how this budgetary independence
is achieved within the statute, nor how it evolved.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).




The lived reality of Fed tenure is the opposite. Governors' terms are a
source of presidential control; Chairs' terms are a source of Fed independence.
This Part explains how practice has come to reverse the plain statutory
intention. It begins by explaining the context for the fourteen-year term and how
practice has undermined it, and it demonstrates how the Fed Chair makes use of
her two statutorily designated roles (as both Chair and Governor) to create a firm
political position that limits the President's freedom of appointment.
A. The Myth of the Governors' Fourteen Year Term
The Chair is perceived as the power behind the System. But it is first worth
highlighting the other Governors and especially the formal and informal
institutions that support-and erode-their independence from the President,
because these institutions have evolved significantly over time. Their legal
protection of a nonrenewable term and the practice-by no means compelled,
but widely followed-of early resignations puts these statutory provisions at
cross purposes. The result is also unexpected, given the emphasis in the Federal
Reserve Act and in the scholarship on the Fed's independence: instead of limiting
the President's ability to choose his Board, the practice of frequent resignations
has enhanced it. Since the Banking Act of 1935 introduced the new Board of
Governors, the President has effectively chosen his Board.
This was not the Banking Act's original design. When the Federal Reserve
System was reorganized in 1935, Congress included this statutory instruction on
the transition from the old Federal Reserve Board system to the new Board of
Governors:
Upon the expiration of the term of any appointive member of the Federal Reserve
Board in office on the date of enactment of the Banking Act of 1935, the President
shall fix the term of the successor to such member at not to exceed fourteen years,
as designated by the President at the time of nomination, but in such manner as to
provide for the expiration of the term of not more than one member in any two-
year period, and thereafter each member shall hold office for a term of fourteen
years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor[.]l26
The idea was to prevent the President from stacking the Board and thus to
provide it with distance and independence. A Governor's is one of the longest
terms of service in the federal government. Scholars have long discussed the Fed
Governors' lengthy tenure, putting forth the propositions that their "staggered"'27
fourteen-year terms prevent the President from immediately stacking the Board
in his favor, or that the "term of office for each member . . . [is] made long
enough . . . to prevent day-to-day political pressures from influencing the
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126. Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 704, codified in 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
127. Bressman & Thompson, supra note 9, at 607-08.
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formulation of monetary policy."1 28 But a tradition of early resignation-a non-
legal institution-makes this legal guarantee less important than it seems.
Excluding the Chairs, the average term of the Governors since the Board was
constituted in 1935129 is just over six years, well within the mainstream of tenures
in independent agencies.1 30 Including the Chairs, the figure is just under seven
years. Indeed, it appears that only one non-Chair Governor in the history of the
Federal Reserve served a full 14-year term, 13 1 although two others served
portions of two terms totaling fourteen years or more.132
The nonrenewable, fourteen-year term is meant not only to insulate the
Governors from the need to curry favor with the President, but it is also meant to
limit the President's ability to overrun the board. The fourteen-year term was not
arbitrarily decided: it corresponds with a seven-member Board of Governors, just
as the ten-year term corresponded with the five-member Federal Reserve Board
prior to the 1935 reorganization. The idea is that each President should only get
two appointments to the Board during a four-year administration.
Table I next page shows this pattern of frequent resignations.
128. Jorge J. Pozo, Bank Holiday: The Constitutionality of President Mahuad's
Freezing ofAccounts and the Closing ofEcuador's Banks, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 61, 90 (2002); see also,
e.g., Barkow, supra note 8, at 24; Bernstein, supra note 7, at 148 n.182.
129. Under the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Board of Governors in
Washington was called the Federal Reserve Board. It was chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Comptroller of the Currency was an ex officio member. The other members of the Board could serve
for ten years. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 25, § 10 (1913). The current governance structure
is codified in 12 U.S.C. § 242. Because of this difference in the Board's original structure and term limits,
I use only governors who have served since 1935.
1 30. See Membership of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1914-
Present, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/bios
/boardmembership.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Membership of the Board of Governors,
1914-Present].
131. George W. Mitchell served from 1961 to 1976. Id.
132. Edward W. Kelley, Jr., served from 1987 to 2001. J.L. Robertson served from
1952 to 1973. Id. Note, too, that M.S. Szymczak served from 1933 to 1961, making him the longest serving
member of the Board. Id. His appointment is not included in this analysis, because he was appointed to




Table 1: Presidential Appointments to the Board of Governors, 1935-2013133
Years in Number of Governor Appointments Per
President Office Appointments Year
Roosevelt 9.7 10 1.0
Truman 7.8 9 1.2
Eisenhower 8 7 0.9
Kennedy 2.8 1 0.4
Johnson 5.2 6 1.2
Nixon 5.6 5 0.9
Ford 2.4 5 2.1
Carter 4 6 1.5
Reagan 8 8 1.0
GHW Bush 4 5 1.2
Clinton 8 6 0.8
GW Bush 8 8 1.0
Obama 5.5 7 1.3
If the staggered terms of the Board of Governors worked in practice as in
theory, the number in the column to the furthest right should be 0.5 (an
appointment every two years). As Table 1 illustrates, only President Kennedy's
appointment control over the Board met that standard. The practice of frequent
resignations has thus completely undermined the legal mechanism that was
designed to check Presidential control over Governor appointments.
The decision not to serve a full term is surprising given the statutory
incentive to serve the full term: Governors are precluded "during the time they
are in office and for two years thereafter to hold any office, position, or
employment in any member bank."1 34 But there is a proviso: "except that this
restriction shall not apply to a member who has served the full term for which he
was appointed."13' The opportunities to translate the benefits of Board service to
personal rewards in the banking sector are probably significant, and, yet,
Governors more often than not end their terms early. Whether this frequent
departure is due to the anonymity of the "C-list political celebrity," a Governor's
lack of authority relative to the Chair, or increasingly varied ways to monetize
Board service beyond the banking sector is unclear.
But the consequence is that an extraordinary legal institution-a term of
service more than double the norm for other independent commissions-is
subverted by practice. Presidents can essentially pick their Boards because
133. Id. Presidential Administrations are calculated to the month, with President
Obama's administration ending in August 2014. President Roosevelt's tenure is dated from the signing of
the Banking Act in August of 1935. Governors who served partial terms and were then reappointed, where
other nominees might have taken their places, are treated as two appointments.
134. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
135. Id.
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Governors do not serve their full term. This statutory mechanism designed to
insulate the Board from political control has become a means by which the
President exercises that control.136
B. The Myth of the Chair's Four- Year Term
Because each Fed Chair is also a sitting Governor, she holds two
appointments: one a four-year renewable term as Chair, the other a fourteen-year
nonrenewable term as a Governor. But the Federal Reserve Act also allows each
Governor to serve the "unexpired term of his predecessor," a means by which a
Governor can extend well beyond the fourteen-year term. Combine the two, and
a Fed Chair could serve for almost twenty-eight years, subject to Presidential
reappointment every fourth year.'37
In principle, this combination should not render the Chair less accountable.
But in practice, this has been the reality. When a Fed Chair seeks reappointment,
she is a leading candidate for that reappointment, even if her initial appointment
was by the sitting President's political opponent. Because of previous patterns of
Chair resignation, the President will nominate a Chair roughly half-way through
the President's term, almost always when the Chair is eligible for another four-
year term as Chair.
The consequence of this staggering between the terms of the President and
Fed Chair increases the independence of the Chair from the President, since the
Chair's reappointment is in the hands of a potential successor. Once secured, the
Chair can do what he will on monetary policy, irrespective of the President's
wishes.
The lived history of the Federal Reserve System is a history of this kind of
independence. William McChesney Martin, Jr. served through five presidential
administrations, from Truman to Nixon. And at times, he conflicted intensely
with the Presidents who (re)appointed him. President Johnson found his
intransigence in monetary policy vexing, and he sought to charm and then
remove him. Martin himself nearly resigned, but he decided against it and lasted
almost twenty years as Fed Chair.'38
Paul Volcker presided over a debilitating recession prior to the 1982
midterm elections, and he was not President Reagan's preference for
reappointment. Indeed, even before inauguration, Reagan's chief domestic
policy advisor warned the public that the President-elect would not commit to
136. This does not mean that the President will always get his first choice for those
slots. President Obama nominated Peter Diamond for an open spot on the Board, but Diamond was deemed
unqualified by Republicans opposed to the nomination. Diamond won the Nobel Prize while his
nomination was pending. See Peter A. Diamond, When a Nobel Prize Isn't Enough, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/06/opinion/06diamond.html.
137. 12 U.S.C. § 244 (2012).
138. See ROBERT P. BREMNER, CHAIR OF THE FED: WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN,




asking "Paul Volcker to remain in his" position as Fed Chair.139 But because he
was a candidate, Reagan and some of his advisors feared the consequences in the
bond markets of the failure to reappoint. Volcker was reappointed.140
President Clinton's reappointment of Alan Greenspan, despite the latter's
credentials as a leading Ayn Randian libertarian,141 was also influenced by
Greenspan's then-extraordinary reputation that might have made his nonrenewal
politically costly to Clinton.142 Sometimes the cost of failing to reappoint a
predecessor's Fed Chair is more financial than political: President Obama
reportedly reappointed Chair Bemanke at some political cost out of fear that the
financial markets would respond adversely to the possible pursuit of monetary
and regulatory policies other than those pursued during Bernanke's management
of the financial crisis during his four-year term as Chair.14 3
The four-year, renewable term provides an opportunity for the President
and public to reassess the Fed Chair's accomplishments. But any sitting Chair
with time left to serve as Governor, who is interested in reappointment, will
likely be a strong candidate. The effective Fed Chair builds a financial and
political constituency to support her eappointment. The president must keep that
constituency in mind when making the reappointment decision, whatever the
statute says. Indeed, of the eight Chairs since the position was created in 1935,
five were appointed by a successive Administration. Four of the five were
reappointed by a successor President of a different party: Martin was appointed
by President Truman and reappointed by Presidents Eisenhower (twice),
Kennedy, and Johnson; Voicker was appointed by President Carter and
reappointed by President Reagan; Greenspan was appointed by President Reagan
and reappointed by Presidents George H.W. Bush, Clinton (twice), and George
W. Bush; and Bemanke was appointed by President George W. Bush and
reappointed by President Obama.
The implications of a Fed Chair that can serve for twenty-years, cultivating
a political base separate from the President, are important for mapping out the
space within which the Fed operates. The Federal Reserve Act gives a shorter
four-year tenure to the Chair to increase her accountability to the President. But
the practice is different. The option to extend the Fed Chair's tenure decreases
the President's freedom of appointment and establishes the Fed Chair as a figure
in government with a more independent base of political support, rather than one
dependent on the President.
139. See WILLIAM L. SILBER, VOLCKER: THE TRIUMPH OF PERSISTENCE 229 (2012).
140. Id. at 230-34.
141. See GREENSPAN, supra note 50, at 51-53.
142. BOB WOODWARD, MAESTRO: GREENSPAN'S FED AND THE AMERICAN BOOM 95-
97 (2000).
143. RON SUSKIND, THE CONFIDENCE MEN 580-82 (2011).
291
Yale Journal on Regulation
C. Conclusion: Legislative Drift
While the Governors' fourteen-year terms were intended to enhance
independence and the Fed Chair's four-year term to enhance accountability,
reality has drifted away from these intentions. This drift encapsulates this
Article's argument about law. The statutory law gives one impression: the lived
experience of Fed personnel practices-high turnover among the Governors,
cultivation of political constituencies in support of the Fed Chairs-diverges
from that impression. This drift has implications for the proper institutional
design of central banks, discussed below in the Article's conclusion. But the fact
that it has occurred at all, and reversed the statutory intent, is remarkable in its
own right.
This drift between law as written and law as lived also illustrates the
descriptive power of this Article's institutional approach, which is the product of
a theoretical combination of law, political science, and history. The statute still
matters enormously, although counterintuitively: the Governor's ability to serve
the unexpired term of his predecessor, intended to enhance independence in the
Board of Governors, in turn creates longevity in the Chair. The institutional
framework demonstrates the political theory of legislative design captured in a
historical moment, similar to Moe's conception of agency design as subject to
historical moments that reflect "the interests, strategies, and compromises of
those who exercise political power."1" Under the framework elaborated in this
Article, the legal mechanisms that constitute the boundaries between the Federal
Reserve are both consequences of Moe's historically contingent political
negotiations, but they are also subject to subsequent amendment by the ongoing
changes in the Fed's lived experience. These changes include frequent
resignations unforeseen by the statutory designers of the Banking Act of 1935
and the ability of the Fed Chair to build an independent political base. The result
is that the customary reading of the Federal Reserve Act as the source of the
Fed's "independence" will not only be misleading, it will be exactly backwards.
IV. The Complicated Doctrine of Removability at the Fed
From a legal perspective, "removability" is the crux of Fed independence.
Legal scholars have been interested in whether the Fed fits the canonical
taxonomy of an independent agency by virtue of removal restrictions on the Fed
Chair. The statute, however, is silent as to Chair removability. This silence is
intriguing both because of the prominence of removability in administrative law
and because the statute is so detailed as to the removability of other actors within
the Fed generally.
This Part explores removability throughout he Federal Reserve System and
discovers both where removability matters (deep within the Federal Reserve




System) and where it does not (for the Fed Chair). It also illustrates some ways
that a careful statutory design can become unmoored from changing legal
realities. This is especially true in the case of the Reserve Bank presidents.
Although they craft federal policy and are equals of the presidential appointees
on the Federal Open Market Committee, the President must reach through two
(maybe three, and perhaps even four) layers of bureaucracy before removing
them. The structure Congress created in 1913 and 1935 is, in this regard,
unconstitutional, but it is unlikely to be changed by judicial intervention. The
D.C. Circuit has considered the question four times and has dismissed it on
justiciability grounds each time. This Part explains the details of this curious
history.145
A. Doctrinal Overview: Appointment and Removability
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution-the Appointments
Clause-requires "Officers of the United States" to be appointed by the President
with the Senate's advice and consent. If Congress wants to set up a bureau or
agency or department staffed by officers of the United States, presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation is the constitutional minimum.
But the Constitution makes an exception to this rule for "inferior Officers."
Congress may vest "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments" the appointment of the inferior officers.14 6 The first question
under the Appointments Clause is thus whether the challenged personnel are
principal or inferior officers. The key precedent for answering that question is
Edmond v. United States, which held that "[w]hether one is an 'inferior' officer
depends on whether he has a superior."1 47 Moreover, "'inferior officers' are
officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level" by officers
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 148 In other words, if a
federal officer has a boss who went through Presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation, that officer is by definition an inferior one.
Determining whether an officer of the United States is "principal" or
"inferior" is only the first question in assessing the constitutionality of her status.
The second involves, at a general level, the principle of the separation of powers
that underlies our constitutional scheme. We have three branches. The President
embodies the executive and must "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."1 49 He is one, but his administration is a legion. Hence the importance
of appointing officers to constitute the President's administration.
But appointment is not enough: the President must also be able to supervise
those he appoints to high office. And here, Congress and the President have
145. See infra notes 204 to 215 and accompanying text.
146. U.S. CONST. art. It, § 2, cl. 2.
147. Edmond v. United States 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997).
148. Id. at 663.
149. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
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tussled over who gets to define the terms of employment for executive officers.
In the iconic 1926 case, Myers v. United States, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft wrote the opinion reviewing a statute that concerned the appointment of
postmasters.150 The statute required an appointed postmaster to receive the usual
advice and consent of the Senate, but it also subjected the removal of the
postmaster to the same restriction.'5 1 The Court thought this a bridge too far, and
determined that he President must have some "power of removing those for
whom he can not continue to be responsible."52
Ten years later, the Court retreated from this view, at least in part. In
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,153 the Court held that Congress can,
under certain circumstances, create independent agencies run by principal
officers appointed by the President, but whom the President may remove only
for good cause. Later, in Morrison v. Olson,154 the Court sustained similar
restrictions on the power of principal executive officers-themselves responsible
directly to the President-to remove their own inferiors.
In 2010 the picture became more complicated. In Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB, the Supreme Court confronted the combination of those two
protections: an agency head removable only for cause-here, the Commissioners
of the Securities Exchange Commission55-who can remove other officers only
for cause-here, members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB). The Court held that "such multilevel protection from removal is
contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President," and
found the provisions that had established the second layer of for-cause protection
unconstitutional.'56
To sum up: the Appointments clause demands the Senate's advice and
consent for principal officers, but not for inferior officers, and even after
appointment, separation-of-powers principles restrict Congress's ability to
protect a federal officer from at-will employment termination. Congress cannot
make the removal of an executive officer subject to its own advice and consent.
But it can insulate a principal officer from getting fired by the President for no
reason or a bad reason, and it can insulate an inferior officer from getting fired
by a principal officer for no reason or a bad reason, so long as that inferior officer
remains subject to direct Presidential supervision. No nesting of protections is
allowed.
Such is the doctrinal state of play. How does the Fed fit within that system?
150. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116, 176 (1926).
151. Id. at 164.
152. Id. at 117.
153. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
154. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988).
155. Interestingly, this removal restriction was presumed by the Court, not indicated
by Congress. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 485-88 (2010);
see also Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1167 (discussing the Court's presumption).




B. The At-Will Fed Chair
1. The Law
The Fed Chair serves two statutorily defined roles. She is the Chair of the
Board, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to a four-year
term. She is also one of seven members of the Board, nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate to a fourteen-year term. The Federal Reserve Act is
clear that, in her capacity as Governor, she is only removable for cause."' The
statute is silent, however, with respect to her removability as Chair.
Given that removability has become the legal hallmark of administrative
independence and that the Fed Chair wields such prominence within the System,
government, and public imagination, this silence is remarkable. Initially, there
seem to be three possible explanations. First, that Congress erred in its silence
and that removability should be inferred. Second, that the equation of
removability with independence makes no sense, since the Fed is considered the
paragon of agency independence yet its head has no removability protection. And
third, that removability protection matters, but only when considered next to
other legal and non-legal mechanisms.
Vermeule explores these and related arguments.58 He concludes that
"formal independence" is unnecessary at the Fed because its Chair is widely seen
as independent without consultation to the Federal Reserve Act-'its
independence is protected by a network of statutory provisions and hoary
conventions."l5 9
The judicial support for this view is strong, as Vermeule points out.160 But
so too is the judicial support for the opposite conclusion: that Congress meant to
give removability protection even when it did not do so explicitly.1 6 1 While
predicting an eventual judicial resolution of this apparent impasse is beyond the
scope of this Article, it does leave the question: is there a "hoary convention"
that rises to the level of a law-like rule that would prevent the President from
dismissing a Fed Chair prior to the end of her four-year term?
Vermeule argues that such a convention exists; this Article advances a
different conception of Fed independence as more historically contingent.
Consider a cruder version of Vermeule's argument, based on three premises: The
formal definition of agency independence means that an agency is only
independent if the head is only removable for cause. Everyone understands that
the Fed is an independent agency, probably the most independent of agencies.
The Federal Reserve Act is silent as to the removability of the Fed Chair. Ergo,
157. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
158. See Vermeule, supra note 8.
159. Id. at 1176.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 485-88 (inferring removability
protection for the SEC Commissioners).
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there must be widespread acceptance of a convention of independence that
renders the Chair practically nonremovable.
The premises are correct; the conclusion is flawed. The more accurate
reconciliation of the conflicting premises is to say, first, that there is more to
legal independence than removability protection (a proposition with which
Verneule clearly agrees). And second that the forces protecting the Fed Chair
from arbitrary dismissal do not come from law or even law-like conventions, but
from the ebb and flow of political calculations made in the moment.
2. Removal as a Political Action
The Fed's history supports this politically contingent view of the
relationship between the Fed Chair and the President. While it's accurate to say
that "no President has ever formally discharged the Fed Chair,"l6 2 the history of
Presidents' dissatisfaction with and treatment of Fed Chairs is more textured than
that. This history shows what Presidents can do and have done with
unsatisfactory Chairs-while the Fed Chairs have significant resources at their
disposal to build their own political bases, these resources are not unlimited. The
relationship between Chair and President is marked much more by the politics of
the moment than Vermeule's account suggests.
The President has never written a letter to a Fed Chair terminating his
employment of the kind that prompted litigation in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, where President Roosevelt made that demand on a Commissioner
of the Federal Trade Commission.163 But to focus on letters is to take a narrow
view of whether and how Presidents can push Fed Chairs aside. The experience
of three Chairs in the post-1935 Fed demonstrates the variety of ways a President
can remove a Fed Chair from a place of influence within the System.
Thomas McCabe, Fed Chair from 1948-1951, provides the example.
McCabe was President Truman's first appointment o the Fed Chair and was seen
as his confidante.1 64 But McCabe in effect betrayed Truman in the historic Fed-
Treasury Accord of 1951. Under the Accord, the Fed and the Truman Treasury
agreed to end the Fed's World War II practice of "monetizing the public debt":
that is, guaranteeing that the government's debt would clear the market at an
agreed-upon rate, no matter whether there was a market for that debt or not.
Marriner Eccles, McCabe's predecessor who stayed on the Board of Governors
after Truman refused to reappoint Eccles to the Chair, had fought hard-initially
against McCabe-to liberate the Fed from these controls.
Tensions flared, leading to a dramatic stand-off between the Truman
Administration and the Fed. During this heady time, Truman summoned the
Federal Open Market Committee-the full committee of the Board of Governors
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plus the twelve Reserve Bank presidents that determines the Fed's open-market
policy-to the Oval Office for the first and only time in its history. He separately
accused them of doing "exactly what Mr. Stalin wants" by refusing to support
the President.1 6 5 Eventually, with McCabe in full agreement, the Fed and
Treasury struck the famed "Accord" that paved the way for a more independent
Fed. But part of the Accord was that McCabe would step aside, as would Eccles;
in their places went members of the Treasury whom Truman preferred.166
But the Accord was not only an agreement; it also was a change in
personnel. McCabe was out, and a Treasury insider-William McChesney
Martin-was in. In fact, McCabe made his resignation contingent on his
participating in the vetting process that named his successor. Martin was
McCabe's first choice, even though the Truman Administration preferred other
candidates. It is not exactly clear why Truman or his Secretary insisted on a
McCabe resignation; other Fed insiders had made more noise about the need for
the Accord, principally Marriner Eccles. That said, his departure, followed by a
replacement from within the Truman Administration, made clear that the
President forced him out for no other reason than the President's preference.
Immediately after his early resignation and replacement by Martin, Senator Paul
Douglas (D-Ill.) saw the personnel shifts as evidence of Treasury machinations
that meant the Accord was much less than it seemed.167
This kind of firing was not unique to McCabe in the Truman
Administration. It also fit Truman's view of other high-profile resignations,
including that of Harry Dexter White from the International Monetary Fund, who
Truman insisted was "fired by resignation" because of White's suspected
Communist sympathies.!6 8 Regardless, it became the common view that
McCabe's resignation was part of a quid pro quo: "Chairman McCabe 'bled' for
Fed independence," wrote one economist writing after the fact.169
William G. Miller represents a very different method of dislocating the Fed
Chair: removal by promotion. Miller was President Carter's first Fed Chair, and
he was widely viewed as incompetent.170 In what may well be unique in the
annals of executive appointment, Miller's removal was not to the ignominy of
the private sector, but to his place as Secretary of the Treasury. To be sure, it is
165. JONATHAN KIRSHNER, APPEASING BANKERS: FINANCIAL CAUTION AND THE
ROAD TO WAR 144 (2007) (quoting Federal Reserve Board, Minutes, January 31, 1951, p. 9).
166. CLIFFORD, supra note 86; KETTL, supra note 2.
167. CLIFFORD, supra note 86, at 267-68. For more on McCabe's resignation and the
fallout, see BREMNER, supra note 138, at 81. For more on the Fed-Treasury Accord and McCabe's roll in
it, see Conti-Brown, supra note 10, ch 1.
168. For Truman's quote on White and the surrounding events, see STEIL, supra note
l10, at 324.
169. For the "bled" quote, see Edward J. Kane, The Re-Politicization ofthe Fed 9 J. OF
FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 743, 743 (1974).
170. KETTL, supra note 2, at 169-171.
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odd to call a promotion a "removal," but the episode has led several to reach this
very conclusion.71
These examples show that neither law nor convention fully protect the Fed
Chair: that protection comes, instead, from politics. Truman had, he felt, the
political cover to force McCabe out; McCabe's acquiescence certainly facilitated
that calculation. And where Carter thought that removal outright might have
limited his freedom of removal, he promoted Miller. In other instances, the
President may not feel that freedom of movement, even when the Fed Chair is
moving policy in a direction the President does not prefer.
The point of this historical exposition is to argue that the presidential
decision whether to remove the Fed Chair is fundamentally a political one.
Removing the Chair entails political costs, and the President will decide to incur
those costs when he deems the Chair's actions sufficiently noxious to warrant
removal. The Chair's vulnerability to at-will removal, then, shows that
removability protection-whether through law or convention-is not equivalent
to agency independence, at least not in the case of the Fed. As a formal matter,
there is no legal separation between the President and the Chair. The Chair serves
at the President's will, and yet the Fed maintains an aura of independence. That
no President has fired a Chair by angry letter tells us more about the operation of
politics and Presidential personnel strategies than about laws or conventions of
Fed independence.
3. Personality and Politics in Fed Independence
The focus on statutory restrictions on removability is flawed for a different
reason: the President seeks to influence the Fed through personal interactions so
fluid and dependent on personality that they do not even rise to the level of
"conventions." These informal appearances of insulation from the President are
an important part of the role, and they depend entirely on the personalities of the
President, Chair, and-to a lesser extent-the Secretary of the Treasury. For
example, keeping up the appearance of Fed independence, whatever the legal
mechanisms, were personal obsessions of Chairs William McChesney Martin,1 7 2
Paul Volcker,173 and Alan Greenspan,174 each of whom seemed constantly
preoccupied by the maintenance of this informal independence.
The trend is best illustrated in the breach. The tenure of Nixon/Ford Era
Chair Arthur Bums is widely regarded as a failure in large part because of his
proximity to President Nixon. A close personal and emotional proximity between
Bums and Nixon was clear from Nixon's own political memoir, published in
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., BREMNER, supra note 138, at 1, 2, 90,116, 117, 151, 160, 180 (2004).
173. SILBER, supra note 139, at 191-95, 266-67.




1962.175 The recently published Bums diaries are filled with references that raise
modem eyebrows about their relationship. Nixon told Burns, for example, about
his appointment of John Connolly as Secretary of Treasury before he announced
it publicly. He then told Bums that Connolly would learn the ropes of his new
cabinet position from Burns.'76 Bums also attended cabinet meetings;177 had his
speeches vetted by Nixon's staff;' 78 cleared his talking points with the President
ahead of a meeting with other central bankers in Basel, Switzerland;179 advised
Nixon on tax, wage, and other fiscal policy;'8 0 made pledges to remain the
President's "true friend" on economic policies before the public;'8 ' and more.'8 2
The division of the Fed's monetary policies from the Administration's economic
policies did not exist during the Nixon-Burns era.
Perhaps in reaction to the anti-example of Burns, Chairs have usually kept
some distance from the President. But as an appointee, the Chair cannot help
having a relationship with the President. Because of this active dynamic, no
assessment of Fed independence is complete without analyzing the specific
relationship between and personalities of the President and Chair. And these
relationships are determined almost exclusively by the identities of the specific
President and Fed Chair. Laws and customs play a smaller role than politics and
personalities.
4. Removability and Personality: The Net Effect for Fed Independence
What, then, is the net effect of the Fed Chair's independence on the Fed's
overall independence? As the foregoing illustrates, that question is impossible to
answer in the abstract, because the nature of the Chair's independence depends
on her relationship with the President, which in turn depends on the personalities
175. RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 309-10 (1962) (outlining Bums's willingness to
suggest the Eisenhower Administration influence the Federal Reserve to swing the 1960 election toward
Nixon).
176. ARTHUR F. BURNS, INSIDE THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION: THE SECRET DIARY OF
ARTHUR BURNS, 1969-1974, at 31 (2010).
177. Id. at 32.
178. Id. at 34.
179. Id. at 40.
180. Id. at 45, 49.
181. Id. at 47.
182. Burns's seven-point list of pledges he delivered to Nixon is worth quoting at
length: "I informed the President as follows: (1) that his friendship was one of the three that has counted
most in my life and that I wanted to keep it if I possibly could; (2) that I took the present post to repay the
debt of an immigrant boy to nation that had given him the opportunity to develop and use his brains
constructively; (3) that there was never the slightest conflict between doing what was right for the
economy and my doing what served the political interests of RN; (4) that if a conflict ever arose between
these objectives, I would not lose a minute in informing RN and seeking a solution together; (5) that the
sniping in the press that the WH staff was engaged in had not the slightest influence on Fed policy, since
I will be moved only by evidence that what the Fed is doing is not serving the nation's best interests; (t)
that the WH staff had created an atmosphere of confrontation which led to the exaggeration of said
differences about economy policy as may exist between the Fed and the Administration; that (7)
squabbling or the appearance of squabbling among high government officers could lead to a weakening
of confidence in government policy and thereby injure the prospects of economy improvement." Id. at 39.
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of the individuals who occupy those offices. While the political realities of Chair
reappointment will favor cross-administration reappointments when the
economic climate favors the policies of the incumbent Chair, reality also
suggests that the Chair has an incentive to cater to an incoming President's
wishes on economic policy. Thus, how their dynamic will play out in practice
will depend on those individuals and their individual, historical, and political
contexts. The legal question of the Chair's removability, however interesting as
a matter of administrative law, is essentially irrelevant. Whether or not law or
convention protects the Chair from removal either expressly or by implication,
legal or conventional removability protection is far less important to the Fed's
independence than the personalities and politics in a given historical moment.
C. Removability and the Reserve Bank Presidents: The Fed's Constitutional
Problem'8 3
The argument that the Fed's policy-making space is constituted by law,
conventions, and politics, each converging at specific moments in history, is
nowhere demonstrated better than in the question of statutory limits on the
President's ability to fire federal officers within the Fed. We have already seen
that there is no such restriction for the Fed Chair; that relationship is governed
mostly by politics. But such is not the case with other officers inside the Fed.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve Act protects the presidents of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) from presidential oversight that it is
unconstitutional. If Free Enterprise Fund presented "Humphrey's Executor-
squared," in Judge Kavanaugh's words, the Federal Open Market Committee
may present Humphrey's Executor-cubed.184 Law matters; it just matters in
unexpected ways.
1. The Federal Open Market Committee and the Constitution
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created twelve Reserve Banks, which
proceeded to create twelve independent monetary policies.185 In 1933, Congress
created the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the Federal Reserve
System's monetary policy committee, to centralize the Banks' policies.186 Two
years later, in the Banking Act of 1935, Congress refashioned the FOMC to
183. I first made similar arguments in the essay, Is the Federal Reserve
Unconstitutional? And Who Decides?, LIBRARY LAW & LIBERTY (Sept. 1, 2013), http://
www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/is-the-federal-reserve-constitutional/. For more on this topic, see
David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee (Columbia Symposium on
Admin. Law & Fin. Regulation, Draft Paper, 2014), http://web.law.columbia.edulsites/default/files
/microsites/millstein-center/cle-reading-_panel_3.pdf.
184. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
185. Act of December 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251.




include all seven members of the newly created Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, which replaced the Federal Reserve Board established
in 1913. The rest of the FOMC included five of the twelve Reserve Bank
presidents on a rotating basis.'88 Since 1942, the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York has been a permanent member of the FOMC. 189 Here,
convention plays an important role: although the statute does not require it, the
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is also Vice Chair of the
FOMC. The Committee meets eight times per year to discuss and announce its
outlook on the global and national economy and its monetary policy decisions.
(This Article need not go into detail about the policy levers the Fed pulls. Others
have provided useful introductions to the Fed's general operations, especially
Stephen Axilrod' 90 and the Fed's own, somewhat dated, overview.)19'
It is the presence of the Reserve Bank presidents on the FOMC that creates
two separate constitutional problems, one with respect to the Appointments
Clause and the other triggering separation-of-powers/removability concerns.
2. The FOMC and the Appointments Clause
To take each in turn, the Reserve Bank presidents are either principal or
inferior officers. The Board of Governors certainly supervises the Reserve Banks
in every other respect, as provided by statute.192 In their roles as Reserve Bank
presidents, the inferior officer designation seems apt. But as members of the
FOMC, Reserve Bank presidents' votes count the same as those of their would-
be superiors-the President-appointed, Senate-confirmed Board Governors.
Thus, Under the Edmond standard, they appear to be "principal" officers who
must be subject o the Appointments Clause. After all, on the FOMC, the Reserve
Bank president has no superior: the FOMC is a committee, and each vote counts
the same as any other. But even if the presidents are inferior officers, they are
not appointed by "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments" the appointment of the inferior officers," as required by the
Appointments Clause.'93
But the Reserve Banks are not appointed under either standard. The
President does not appoint, and the Senate does not confirm, the Banks'
presidents, nor are they appointed as inferior officers by a head of department.1 94
Instead, the presidents are appointed through a circuitous process that begins
with the Reserve Bank's board of directors. Each board is divided into three
187. Act of August 23, 1935, 49 Stat. 705.
188. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a)
189. Act of June 7, 1942, 56 Stat. 647.
190. AXILROD, supra note 21, at 41-64 (2013).
191. THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 21, at 27-
51.
192. E.g., id. § 301.
193. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2012).
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classes of three directors each.195 Class A directors are bankers selected by
the regulated banks.'96 Class B directors are non-bankers selected by the
regulated banks. Class C directors are non-bankers selected by the Board of
Governors in Washington, D.C.197 Until the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010, the directors voted as a whole to select the Reserve Bank president; after
Dodd-Frank, now only Class B and C directors take that vote.198 The President
has no legal role whatsoever in appointing either the Reserve Bank presidents or
the Reserve Bank directors.1 99
In other words, it does not matter whether the Reserve Bank presidents are
considered principal officers or inferior officers; their appointment procedure
violates the constitutional requirements in either context.
3. Removability and the FOMC
The Reserve Banks have a separate constitutional problem with respect to
the separation of powers/removability question raised by the Supreme Court in
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB. Unlike the case with the removal of the Fed
Chair, the Federal Reserve Act has an intricate, even conflicting statutory regime
for the removal of the Reserve Banks. The President, though, has no role to play
whatsoever. He appoints and the Senate confirms the seven members of the
Board of Governors, who are statutorily members of the FOMC. Governors are
removable by the President "for cause" only.200
From here, there is a fork in the statute. Removal authority for the Reserve
Bank presidents appears to be lodged in two boards: the Board of Governors in
Washington and the Reserve Banks' board of directors (where removal is at the
directors' pleasure). Under section 248(f) of the statute, the Governors have the
authority to "remove any officer or director of any Federal reserve bank, the
cause of such removal to be forthwith communicated in writing by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the removed officer or director and
to said bank."201
The "cause of such removal" language comes from the original Federal
Reserve Act of 1913. The "cause" language is a term of art, in use in other
statutes passed by the same Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court has
sufficient to trigger the removability restrictions under discussion here.202
195. Id. § 341.
196. Id.
197. Id. §301.
198. An Act of July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2126 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 341).
199. Id. § 263(a).
200. Id. § 242.
201. Id. § 248(f).




At the same time, the Act also gives the Reserve Bank directors the ability
to "dismiss such officers or employees, or any thereof, at pleasure."203 This
provision was not part of the original Federal Reserve Act of 1913, but was added
in 1919.204 Would a court charged with construing the statute give the Reserve
Bank presidents two masters? The question is difficult to answer, but also legally
irrelevant: either way, the Reserve Bank presidents are protected by two layers
of removability protection, precisely the institutional design the Supreme Court
struck down in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.
Assume a court would read the Federal Reserve Act in its fullest context,
and place the appointment and removal authority in the same hands (that is, the
Reserve Banks' own board of directors). In that case, if the President does not
like the Reserve Banks' presidents' votes on the FOMC, to remove them from
office, he would have to legally reach through the Board of Governors (protected
from summary dismissal) who would have to reach through the Reserve Banks'
board of directors (protected from summary dismissal) who could fire the
Reserve Bank presidents at their pleasure. In other words, the President would
have to reach through three layers, one beyond the two the Court already deemed
unconstitutional in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.205 Granted, the
relationships between the three layers in the FOMC and the two in the SEC-
PCAOB are different-the presidents and the Governors are colleagues together
on the FOMC, rather than separate ntities. But that difference only sharpens the
separation of powers problems for the Reserve Banks-their authority is the
equivalent of the Board of Governors in their capacities as members of the
FOMC, but while the President can exercise control over the Board through the
appointment process, he gets no such authority over the Reserve Banks. For these
reasons, the FOMC, as currently designed, is unconstitutional.
The unconstitutionality of the Reserve Banks' governance highlights the
way that law, politics, and custom interact to create a separate policy-making
space for the Federal Reserve. Here, the focus is on law, but in an unexpected
place. Judges have long looked at appointments and removability as the hallmark
of an agency's independence, as discussed above in great detail. But that focus
is usually-and erroneously, in the case of the Federal Reserve-at the top. Here,
the Federal Reserve Act gives ample removability protection to the Reserve Bank
presidents to limit Presidential interference. That it does so in a way that violates
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution's demands only illustrates
how much law-as-written can matter, even if in surprising ways.
203. 12 U.S.C. § 614 (2012).
204. An Act of Dec. 24, 1919, 41 Stat. 379.
205. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 485-88
(2010).
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4. Governor Vacancies and the FOMC
Instead of ameliorating the constitutional problems created by the law as
written, the lived experience of presidential appointments and vacancies have
exacerbated them. Recall that the FOMC is structured so that the President-
appointed, Senate-confirmed Board Governors constitute a numerical majority
of voting members. This structure could thus be defended on the grounds that,
so long as the majority holds, the lack of public vetting and confirmation of
Reserve Bank presidents, and the two or three levels of removability protection
do not cause constitutional problems. The Reserve Bank presidents cannot create
federal policy because they are consistently outnumbered by Presidential
appointees.
The argument depends on whether the Governors in fact enjoy a majority.
The chart below indicates the historical trend.206 From 1945 until 1977, after the
new Board of Governors finished displacing the Federal Reserve Board over the
last ten years of the Roosevelt Administration, the Governors enjoyed a majority
nearly 100% of the time. The majority fell to parity, and never lower, for just
sixteen days in thirty-two years. In the Carter Administration, things started to
slide. Carter's appointees and their predecessors on the Board held an FOMC
majority about 85% of the time. That majority was back up above 90% during
the eight-years of the Reagan Administration. A slow descent began after that,
bottoming at the Obama administration's record of 42%. That is, 58% of the
time, private bankers held a majority on the FOMC. The Obama administration
holds another ignominious record relating to the constitutional debility of the
FOMC: it is the first Administration to take the Governors to a minority, which
it has done three times.207
The Governors' majority on the FOMC is therefore unstable. This structural
sea change has occurred largely over the last two generations, and is exacerbated
by the expectation of continued vacancies at the end of an administration.20 This
reality also means that any defense of the FOMC based on the 7-5 majority of its
public officials is no defense at all.
The dynamic between the very real legal effect of the Federal Reserve Act's
governance provisions establishing the FOMC, and the presidential practice of
failing to fill Governor vacancies, illustrates the Article's argument: the Fed's
"independence," the policy space it occupies separate from the other branches of
government, is subject to a mix of law as written, law as practiced, conventions,
and politics, all converging in specific historical moments. The reliance on
206. 1 developed some of these ideas for a popular audience in Peter Conti-Brown, The
Constitutional Crisis at the Federal Reserve, POLITICO MAG., April 14, 2014, http://www.politico.com
/magazine/story/2014/04/federal-reserve-constitutional-crisis-105663.html.
207. Membership ofthe Board ofGovernors, 1914-Present, supra note 130.
208. For a thorough exploration of vacancies in administrative agencies, see Anne





merely reading the Federal Reserve Act, stripped of judicial interpretations,
appointment practices, and the influence of personalities, tells an incomplete and
inaccurate story about the nature of the Fed's place within government.
Figure 1: Governors' Majority on the FOMC












D. Judicial Protection of the FOMC's Unconstitutional Structure
The story of the judiciary and Fed independence is not complete, however,
with a conclusion that the Supreme Court would likely find the governance
structure of the FOMC unconstitutional. Instead, the courts have created judicial
barriers to prevent that litigation from ever reaching the merits. In this way-
somewhat ironically, given how closely associated courts are with law-making-
legal doctrines that have nothing to do with the Federal Reserve Act have created
a kind of hedge around Fed independence that is simultaneously a legal and non-
legal mechanism.
To understand this judicial hedge around Fed independence, we need to
know more about the ways that individuals have challenged the FOMC's
structure in the past. In the 1970s and 1980s, a series of petitioners-a
Congressman, a Senator, private citizens, then another Senator--challenged the
structure of the FOMC on constitutional grounds. And in each case, the D.C.
Circuit-the initial appellate forum for most litigation on this issue-refused to
reach the merits.2 09 Henry Reuss, a Democratic member of the House of
209. See Melcher v. FOMC, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Comm. for Monetary
Reform v. Bd. of Governors, 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Riegle v. FOMC, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.)
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Representatives from Wisconsin, argued that the appointment process for the
Reserve Banks prevented him, in his capacity as a legislator, from introducing
impeachment proceedings under Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. The
court made quick work of this circuitous theory of injury.210 For the private
citizens, the suit was bounced because theirs were "generalized grievances
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens" whose
adjudication would "require the courts to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more
competent o address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be
unnecessary to protect individual rights." 211
But for the two senators-Senator Donald Riegle, a Democrat from
Michigan, and Senator John Melcher, a Democrat from Montana-the analysis
was quite different. In each case, the plaintiffs' theory of injury rested on his
inability to advise and consent on the appointment of a principal officer
exercising federal authority delegated by the U.S. Congress. Beginning with
Riegle, the court found that Senator Riegle's "inability to exercise his right under
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution is an injury sufficiently personal to
constitute an injury-in-fact." 2 12 Where Representative Reuss and the private
citizens could not demonstrate injury, Senator Riegle could.
But where the Riegle court gave with one hand, it took with the other. The
Riegle court felt uncomfortable inserting itself into the legislative mix by
concluding that the statutory design of the Federal Reserve Act had injured a
Senator who wanted no part of that design. In other words, the court did not want
to adjudicate injuries one group of legislators caused another. To avoid that
adjudication, the Riegle court, explicitly following the logic of a law review
article written by a D.C. Circuit judge not on the panel,213 decided that "[t]he
most satisfactory means of translating our separation-of-powers concerns into
principled decisionmaking is through a doctrine of circumscribed equitable
discretion."2 14 In other words, "equitable discretion allows courts to dismiss a
case that presents separation-of-powers concerns without making those concerns
(1981); Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.) (1978). As Mark Bernstein explains in his excellent (if
dated) treatment ofthe FOMC's constitutionality, the first challenge to open-market activities was actually
in the Second Circuit under the Federal Reserve Board system, which predates the FOMC. See Bernstein,
The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75
VA. L. REv. 11l, 132 n.90 (1989) (discussing Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 34 F.2d 910
(2d Cir. 1929)).
210. Reuss, 584 F.2d at 467.
211. Committee for Monetary Reform, 766 F.2d at 543 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490,499 (1975)).
212. 656 F.2d at 873.
213. Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintifs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241
(1981).




part of the standing test."215 The Melcher decision, decided eight years later,
followed the Riegle decision.2 16
The courts are therefore unlikely to put a bandage on the unconstitutionality
of the FOMC. The consequence is that, with respect to the President's ability to
control the FOMC through personnel decisions, the statute creates a law that is
so protective of the Fed's distinct personality that it arguably violates the
Constitution. The judiciary, invoking doctrines that have nothing to do with the
statute itself, creates additional hedges around that unconstitutional structure.
The appointment and removability issues around the FOMC demonstrate the
problem with too much reliance on the statute alone. Fed independence is a
creature of much more than legislative enactment, as important as those
enactments are.
E. Conclusion: The Life of the Federal Reserve Act
The curious case of removability protection within the Federal Reserve
System-so complicated and circuitous in the case of the Reserve Bank
presidents, so missing in the case of the Fed Chair-presents a quandary for the
existing legal theory of Fed independence.
The quandary is resolved by analyzing the difference between law as
created and law as implemented. The law created a Fed Chair answerable to the
President every four years with no protection from at-will termination. In
practice, this structure tells us little. Sometimes the President refuses to
renominate a Fed Chair-to his detriment in the case of Marriner Eccles, to his
credit in the case of G. William Miller-which can function like a removal. But
those decisions are more informed by political and personal forces than legal
ones.
Removability restrictions around the Reserve Bank presidents, on the other
hand, owe much to law. The legal structure of the FOMC essentially prevents
the President from meddling with Reserve Bank participation on that Committee,
despite how central monetary policy has become. But even here, context-in this
case a judicial one-has given the terms of the statute new life. Courts have
pronounced constitutional principles and declared adjudication of those
principles impossible, thereby allowing a unique and illegal institutional design
to continue its trajectory. In fact, Justice Breyer's dissent in Free Enterprise
Fund included a list of all those agencies that might be affected by the case's
215. Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The
Past, Present, and Future ofLegislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 238 (2001).
216. The Supreme Court, in a subsequent treatment of legislative standing in Raines v.
Byrd, embraced a similar conclusion regarding legislators' ability to challenge a statute's constitutionality.
The claim underlying Raines different from that of a Senator who is denied the ability to give advice and
consent to a principal officer's appointment o a federal position. But the decision is animated by a similar
theory. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816-17 (1997) (citing Moore v._U. S. House of
Representatives,_733 F.2d 946,950-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Moore relies substantially on Riegle. See Moore,
733 F.2d at 955-57.
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holding.2 17 Perhaps inadvertently, the FOMC was excluded from the list. It was
an appropriate exclusion: given courts' previous discomfort with engaging in the
constitutional issues around the appointment and removability of the Reserve
Bank presidents, it is unlikely that we will see a judicial resolution to this
question.
The FOMC's enduring unconstitutional structure demonstrates the
descriptive power of this Article's argument. It is not merely by convention that
the Fed enjoys this peculiar protection from constitutional requirements: judge-
made law is still law. But it is the case that the statute insulating Fed actors from
presidential oversight-in combination with judge-made law and other lived
experience-is of far greater moment than it might seem. The FOMC is an
unconstitutional structure that endures because the judiciary, over time, has
chosen to permit it.
Conclusion
The Fed has had an extraordinary century. But its future, including the ways
it will formulate and implement national and global economic policy, remains
contested. As scholars and policymakers debate what he Fed has been, what it
is, and what it should be, they can find guidance in understanding the institutions
of Fed independence-with an appropriate, nuanced understanding of the
relationship between law, conventions, history, and politics. Without that
understanding, critics and defenders will not only talk past each other, but they
will talk past the institutional features of the Federal Reserve itself.
As this Article has illustrated, the Fed's relationship with Congress and the
President are regulated by a tangle of institutions legal and non-legal, formal and
informal. The assumption that law is the exclusive source of Fed independence
is wrong. But the opposite assumption, that law is irrelevant, is also incorrect.
The reality is that the institutions of Federal Reserve independence consist of
much more. The Federal Reserve Act matters, from the removal of the Fed from
the appropriations process, the fourteen-year terms of the Governors, the four-
year terms of the Chair, the appointment procedure of the Reserve Bank
presidents, and the removability protections on those Presidents on the FOMC.
But the institutions of Federal Reserve independence also include the role of
personalities, including the relationship between the Fed Chair and the President.
And the institutions include changes in historical practice, such as the elimination
of the gold standard, real bills doctrine, and monetary autonomy of the Reserve
Banks.
Taken together, this broader picture of Fed independence includes the
relationship between the Federal Reserve Act as recorded in the U.S. Code and
the Federal Reserve System as it lives in the world. The argument is not that law





is irrelevant, that all is politics. It is that law is incomplete. The Federal Reserve
System-its many committees, the many individuals who reside within it, those
on the outside who seek to influence it-lives in the world. To understand Fed
independence, we must understand that world.
A better understanding of the ways that laws can change over time-
including and especially without subsequent legislative change-has normative
implications. Most important is the tangled (and unconstitutional) governance
structure discussed at length in this Article. The unconstitutionality of the
Reserve Banks' appointment and removal structure is not simply a question of
"etiquette or protocol," as the Supreme Court put it: ensuring that these
extraordinarily powerful officials of the United States government conform to
the requirements of the public accountability at the appointments level is "among
the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme."218
But the implications of the Article's argument, that the institutions of
Federal Reserve independence are more important than the statute taken in
isolation, also invites skepticism about the ability of institutional designers to
make enduring changes to the Federal Reserve Act that will always match their
original intentions. The very existence of the Federal Reserve Banks owes itself
to a political compromise whose merits have long since receded into history. So,
too, with the Fed's extraordinary budgetary independence, which as taken on a
far greater degree of autonomy than its original designers intended.
That statutory change is not the most enduring kind of reform in
institutional design should not invite skepticism in the potential for democratic
oversight. Instead, it focuses attention on simplifying and prioritizing the
appointments to the Federal Reserve. As the graph in Part IV indicates, filling
the vacancies on the Fed's Board of Governors has not been a priority for the last
several presidential administrations. Changing that course-in addition to
simplifying the governance structure at he Federal Reserve Banks-would go a
long way to ensuring greater public accountability at the Fed. There is no
guarantee that statutory change will perform as expected. But regular changes to
the appointments at the Fed will be more effective in ensuring that the public can
participate in managing the Federal Reserve System without erasing the enduring
aspects of its autonomy that the institutions of Fed independence have tried to
establish.
A better understanding of the institutional context of the Fed's
independence also serves another purpose, beyond pointing the way forward for
discussing Fed reform. It invites skepticism about some of the certainty of
viewing Fed independence as a yes-or-no binary. Instead of jumping to
categorical conclusions about the defensibility of Fed independence, this Article
takes a step back and suggests a more cautious approach. That approach begins
by asking what we really mean by "Fed independence" in the first place. As this
218. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (citing in part Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976)).
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Article has argued at length, not all is as it seems within the Federal Reserve Act;
taking a more methodologically diverse approach to the Fed through law, history,
and politics, will allow for a more focused debate.
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